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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates organization and management issues associated with
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to modernize the nation's Air
Traffic Management (ATM) system. Focus is placed specifically on efforts by the
FAA to implement a satellite-based navigation system in accord with the ICAO's
definition of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The US Global
Positioning System (GPS) provides much of the capability desired in the GNSS,
but enhancements are required to meet full capability required for civil aviation
purposes. The research examined the working relationships and the
management processes used in the course of major system development and
acquisition. The research and analysis discovered a strong functional
orientation in the FAA. The research also identified a significant difference in
cultural attributes between the two major divisions in the agency: Systems
Operations and Systems Development. The combination of these differences
serves to impede communication and cooperation among development project
participants at the agency and, therefore, to inhibit identification and
development of new systems to satisfy airspace users needs. In addition
recommendations are made for improvements to the agency's acquisition policy
and to system development processes.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduction
The United States has the safest and most efficient air traffic management
system in the world. On an average day there are about 400,000 aircraft flights
through the nation's airspace including over 30,000 flying hours per day in air
carrier operations out of a total of about 150,000 hours per day for flights of all
types.' Most procedures used in this system are, perhaps surprisingly,
essentially those developed during the 1930's in an earlier era, with navigation
and communication technology several generations removed from that
available today. In addition to the procedures, much of the air traffic
management infrastructure in use today, including communications, navigation,
surveillance and control automation features are technically obsolescent.
Considering these facts, that the system functions as robustly and safely as it
does is a strong testament to the skills and motivation of the air traffic controller
workforce.
By the same token, both the procedures and hardware and software
infrastructures in use today in the nation's air traffic management system are
patched together by a combination of technical band-aids, misoriented
technology developments only partially realized and incremental improvements
in hidebound tradition. The capabilities of modern commercial technology often
exceed that being employed and implemented by the FAA in its modernization
programs.. More importantly, the FAA, which is responsible for the development
of new systems to modernize the ATM system, does not consistently apply a
1 Aviacni System Capital Investment Plan, p.1-0-11.
disciplined approach to define operational objectives, operational requirements
or functional specification to evaluate and select the best approaches to ATM
system modernization. While great efforts have been made within the agency to
impose a systematic process for new system development and acquisition,
certain organizational and management arrangements serve to preclude
successful development of these new systems and procedures. The agency is
dominated by its System Operations staff which conducts the daily work of
operating the air traffic management system. The character and orientation of
personnel in the other major staff contributing to modernization development
efforts, System Development, differ significantly from those in System
Operations, which tends to impede communication between the staffs. The FAA
organizational structure and reward system act to further inhibit dialog between
the groups. In addition, the acquisition process in place at the agency omits
important tasks required for apt project concept definition. Rigorous
implementation of the acquisition policy also remains as a goal yet to be
achieved.
Thesis Roadmap
The remainder of this chapter provides background information on air traffic
management and airspace system needs, brief description of the US Global
Positioning System and a description of the major international coordinating
body for civil aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This
chapter also describes the methods used in the thesis research. Chapter 2
describes the organization and culture of the five groups in the FAA that are the
major participants in new system development. Chapter 2 also describes the
processes used by the agency to conduct new system development and
acquisition, to prioritize among alternative projects and to complete capital
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budgeting for those projects. Chapter 3 analyzes the functional and cultural
differences between system developers and system operators and discusses
the implications of strong biases among FAA staffs. Deficiencies in staff
effectiveness and in system development and acquisition processes are also
identified in Chapter 3 and alternatives proposed, including the consequences
of a systems thinking approach. The nature and relevance of interactions
between the FAA and the international community are discussed in Chapter 3
as well. Finally, Chapter 4 draws conclusions from the analysis and makes
recommendations for FAA organization and management.
Background
Air Traffic Management and the National Airspace
The national airspace is finite, and ATM is the method by which aircraft
operations are managed to take maximum advantage of the space available.
Current ATM operations and technology are reaching their limits; operations at
Newark and La Guardia airports, for instance, now face delays on about 10% of
all flights2. Aircraft operations have increased 40% in the last decade. During
that interval, the FAA has been attempting -- and failing -- to implement a more
modern, efficient and higher-capacity ATM system. Traffic is expected to grow a
further 30% in the next ten years.3 It is the task of ATM to develop innovative
management concepts that allow more numerous and efficient operations
within the limited space available. Airspace system users are clearly signaling
their need for more capacity. United Airlines, for example, estimates that
various flight operations restrictions cost the airline $647 million each year.
RTCA, Inc., a not-for-profit aviation advisory corporation, estimates that capacity
benefits enabled by more precise navigation and position reporting than
2 Review of the FAA RE&D Program, p 7.
3 GAOrr-RCED-93-36, p 1.
currently in the system would generate airline savings of $13.2 billion between
1995 and 20154. The benefits in efficiency and capacity of better ATM are
economically enormous. Realizing these efficiency and capacity improvements
is one of the function of the Federal Aviation Administration and is one of its
most important objectives. Whether the FAA has the appropriate skills and the
organizational structure to achieve these objectives is the subject that will be
examined in this thesis.
Global Positioning System (GPS)
The GPS is a satellite-based radionavigation system deployed and operated by
the Department of Defense (DOD). When fully operational, GPS provides
highly accurate three-dimensional position, velocity, and time to users
worldwide. Since its inception, in the early 1970s, GPS was envisioned and
has proven to be a significant means of enhancing the war fighting capability of
US and allied military forces. GPS initial operational capability was achieved in
December, 1993 and full capability is anticipated in summer, 1994.
GPS was conceived, developed, and fielded as a military system; specific civil
requirements were not included in it design specifications. Nevertheless civil
use of the system has always been an implicit consideration. Civil use is
growing in importance and integral to the development of policies under which
GPS is operated and made available by the cooperative effort of the DOD and
Department of Transportation (DOT).
Widespread civil and military use of the system is occurring. Worldwide civil
applications of GPS for navigation, positioning and timing are increasing at a
4 Aviation Week, January 10, 1994, p. 53.
rapid rate. Although not yet widely operational in civil aviation, GPS is
generally recognized as having the potential to provide the greatest
enhancements to worldwide aviation system capacity, efficiency, flexibility and
safety since the introduction of radio-based navigation more than 50 years
ago.5
ICAO/FAA Interactions
The ICAO is the one worldwide organization whose objective is to coordinate
and develop standardized civil aviation policies. Virtually all the world's
sovereign nations are members. The formal relationship between ICAO and
the United States is managed through the Department of State, which
delegates authority to the Department of Transportation, and thus to the FAA, for
procedural and technical matters. In practical fact, therefore, FAA is the
designated US representative to the one pseudo-governmental international
civil aviation agency in the world. ICAO is also affiliated with the United
Nations, but operates autonomously.
ICAO is composed of several bureaus including three to deal with its main
operations: Air Navigation, Air Transport and Technical Cooperation. The Air
Navigation Bureau is responsible for world issues relating to aviation
communications, navigation, surveillance and weather as well as airspace
operations and airworthiness. Since the founding of ICAO, the Director of the
Air Navigation Bureau has been an American and usually a former FAA
employee.
There are several standing committees that perform the work of establishing
technical standards and procedures. In addition, the organization constitutes
5 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, p. ES-1.
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special committees from time to time as may be necessary to study particular
issues that develop. The Special Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems,
for example, is one of these. The main connection between FAA and ICAO is
these technical committees. The FAA supports the work of the FANS
committee, like the standing committees, with experienced working-level
people; most of them originate in the Systems Engineering and Development
group (ASD). Higher level management participation is generally included only
when required.
The main role of ICAO, as described to me by a manager in the Air Navigation
Bureau, is to promote common understanding on technical issues and establish
standards that can be met and adopted by the world's countries. These are
referred to as Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). ICAO as a
body monitors but does not promote any solution that could be considered
either controversial or technically immature. At the same time, ICAO is working
on a number of institutional issues that were identified as part of the FANS
committee work in 1991, including charging practices for global navigation
services, reliability, availability and integrity monitoring, and international
control structures. A CNS/ATM committee was created to research these topics
and is scheduled to report in the autumn of 1994.
Research Methods
There are many possible explanations for, or contributors to, the FAA's
difficulties with its ATM system modernization. A fair body of literature has
developed which examines the history and analyzes various factors influencing
system modernization. A series of reports prepared to support Congressional
testimony, in particular, have commented on management issues relating to the
poor overall performance in bring the Capital Investment Plan to fruition. These,
and other, reports are reference in the bibliography. These reports, however,
are fairly high-level; they do not examine in very great detail the internal
management and organizational issues which determine the performance of
the agency. In addition to the public records, therefore, direct information is
considered to be invaluable to obtain the experience, insight, and opinion of
managers most immediately involved with the issues of GPS/GNSS
development. Issues to be examined included acquisition process definition
and practice, organizational structure both formal and informal working
coalitions, workload, cultural orientation, definition of the customer, and
availability of relevant development tools and skills.
Preliminary conversations with several managers in government, academia and
industry led to a perception of the FAA as embodying several general
characteristics:
- safety rules -- no activity is countenanced until its safety is assured.
- very conservative and fairly traditional -- policies and procedures are long-
lived and evolve from what has gone before; promotion occurs from within.
- bureaucratic -- not governed to any appreciable extent by the Administrator.
- "gray" collar -- there are lots of technicians in the workforce; over 70% of the
workers in the FAA are either air traffic controllers or maintenance
technicians.
- Operations tends to rule -- 95% of workforce and 69% of the budget are
controlled by the Executive Director for Operations.
- System Engineering & Development people are outsiders -- ASD is located
apart from Headquarters and the rest of the agency; most of the rest of the
agency is involved with running the air traffic control system.
Research Hypotheses
The characteristics enumerated above constitute only the most general, and in
some cases, anecdotal description of the FAA. Nonetheless, along with the rich
history of developmental difficulty discussed in the first chapter, the general
characteristics lead to a series of hypotheses that may be researched:
1) FAA has at least two distinct cultures within its bounds. The majority of the
workforce, and perhaps the power center, is grown from the ranks of the air
traffic controllers and maintenance technician staffs. The engineers and
scientists who comprise Systems Development, including NAS
Development (AND) and Systems Engineering & Development (ASD), form
a distinct minority culture, set apart from the rest of the agency.
2) Both cultures are involved in, and responsible for, defining and developing
new ATM systems and procedures. Neither group is clearly in charge of this
process.
3) Neither group, nor the agency as a whole, has a clear image of who its
customer is for ATM modernization, what their needs are or how to
contribute to successful accomplishment of a common goal.
4) The organizational structure of the FAA is not arranged to ameliorate the
obstacles to effective work performance created by two distinct cultures.
These hypotheses were examined by investigating the public record, the open
literature and by private interviews with responsible managers at the FAA and in
related organizations.
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Data Collection
In addition to the standard literature research, interviews were conducted with
about ten executives and managers at the FAA. In addition, seven managers
from organizations that work closely with the FAA, such as MITRE, Lincoln Lab,
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, ICAO and the ATA were also
sampled for information. The focus of the interviews was to elicit managers'
perceptions on several topics:
- how are requirements defined for ATM system modernization?
- how are priorities selected from among competing requirements for scarce
resources (both financial and human)?
- who controls the budgets? the people?
- who is responsible for system development at different stages of the
process?
- how are system selections determined and who is responsible for bringing
the new system to "market?"
- what are the ramifications of needing to operate in an international sphere
(e.g. as stipulated by ICAO FANS definition)?
Examples of interview guides for FAA officials and for ICAO managers are
attached to this report as Appendix A. Managers were selected for interviews
based on their functional involvement in GPS/GNSS system development or
operation. In almost all cases, managers made themselves available for face-
to-face interviews in their offices. In a few instances, in-person meetings could
not be arranged, so interviews were conducted by telephone. In a very few
cases, no occasion could be arranged to discuss these issues even by
telephone for a couple key managers. In general, however, these busy people
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were very willing to spend a reasonable amount of time discussing these
matters -- generally one hour. In virtually every case, managers were friendly
but candid in their responses -- so far as I could judge.
CHAPTER 2: AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION
PLANS
This chapter describes the modernization plans that have been developed in
the US by the FAA and internationally by the ICAO. Historical perspective is
provided to the US plans starting with a description of the original National
Airspace System (NAS) Plan and proceeding through the current Capital
Investment Plan (CIP). International plans as defined by ICAO are not as
detailed at the project level but also define a suite of systems to provide modern
ATM services. Finally in this chapter a comparison is drawn of the US CIP with
the international ICAO plans.
US ATM Modernization Plans
A short description of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is in order prior
to any description of the plans to update or improve the system. ATM is
composed of "air traffic control" and " traffic flow management". Air traffic control
refers to the tactical safety separation service that prevents collisions between
aircraft and between aircraft and obstructions. Traffic flow management refers
to the process that allocates traffic flows to scarce capacity resources such as
airspace, runways and taxiways. Air traffic management, then, is the composite
process that ensures safe, efficient and expeditious movement of aircraft from
origin to destination. The ATM system requires controllers to communicate with
each other and with pilots; requires flight crews and controllers to know their
aircraft position and direction of flight with varying degrees of accuracy during
different phases of flight; requires both controllers and flight crews to have
timely access to relevant weather information. The basic building blocks
supporting the ATM system are the communication, navigation, surveillance
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and weather reporting functions. In addition, high speed computers are
essential to automate of large amounts of data processing required to aid
controllers in their performance of ATM duties.
Goals for the future ATM system are:
- maintain and improve the safety of flight operations
- increase system capacity and fully utilize capacity resources as required to
meet traffic demands in all visibility conditions
- better accommodate user-preferred flight trajectories
- better accommodate the full range of aircraft types and avionics capabilities
- improve aviation for users, including weather observations and forecasts,
traffic congestion and delays, status of NAS facilities and airports, and in-
flight situational awareness based on cockpit display of traffic information
- improve navigation and landing capabilities, including curved approach,
missed-approach, and departure guidance and eventually a satellite-based
capability approaching Category I. Category I precision operations should
be supported at all airports serviced by air carriers with Category Ill provided
at the pacing airports1
- increase user involvement in decision-making, including computer-based,
air-ground negotiation of flight trajectories.2
1 Category I is an instrument landing system approach procedure that accommodates landing with
200 foot ceiling and runway visual range of at least 1800 ft; Category 11 with 100 foot ceiling and
runway visual range not less than 1200 ft.; Category lila with no minimum (i.e. zero) ceiling and
runway visual range of 700 ft; Category Ilb with no ceiling and runway visual range of 150 ft;
Category lic with no ceiling and no (i.e. zero) runway visual range.
2Concepts and Description of the Future ATM System for the US, p. 4.
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National Airspace System (NAS) Plan
Pressure mounted in the late 1970's to modernize the nation's air traffic
management (ATM) system as the national airspace system became
increasingly crowded. The national ATM system had evolved incrementally
from the earliest days of air traffic control in the 1930's; most of the procedures
and much of the equipment supporting the system was based on the technology
of that era. The number and complexity of aircraft operations through the
airspace was on the rise partly as a result of the increased number of
operations due to airline deregulation and also due the sharply rising number of
sophisticated general aviation operations. Many general aviation operations
use the full capability of the system to operate in virtually all weather with high
performance aircraft. In response to these pressures and in recognition of the
availability of new technology, in 1981 the FAA developed and approved a
grand plan to modernize the nation's ATM system. The project was entitled the
National Airspace System (NAS) Plan and was intended as a coherent
approach to the modernization of the nation's aviation airspace-related
infrastructure3. It incorporated a comprehensive set of projects to address
impending obsolescence in all functional areas of the system architecture,
including automation, telecommunication, navigation and landing, surveillance,
weather and maintenance and operations. These functional areas are defined
by the FAA4 as:
Automation -- Those subsystems that provide assistance to system operators
to satisfy airspace user needs for service including the accommodation of
3 Other aspects of the nation's aviation infrastructure, notably airports and security-related issues
are handled by means of another major program: the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). The
AIP deals with airport facilities improvements including runways, taxiways and parking areas,
passenger and cargo handling areas and airport and aircraft operations security. Further
discussion of the AIP is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 1-0-19.
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increasing demand, desire for user preferred routes/altitudes , and delivery
of improved weather services.
Telecommunications -- The subsystems that provide the capability for the
air/ground and ground/ground voice and data communications, and the
inter-facility communications of information such as aircraft surveillance
data.
Navigation and Landing --Those subsystems that provide pilots with
accurate knowledge of their aircraft position so that they can properly
navigate the aircraft in all weather conditions.
Surveillance -- Those subsystems that provide the position data of aircraft in
the US airspace, on the airport surface, and over the ocean.
Weather -- The subsystems that provide both pilot and controller with the
meteorological information necessary to ensure safe and efficient aircraft
and system operations. This includes knowledge of weather phenomena,
such as severe weather, windshear, clear air turbulence, microbursts, wake
vortex, wind aloft, precipitation, and icing.
Maintenance and Operations -- The subsystems that ensure high quality
service and provide continued operation of the various system elements
through monitoring, control, maintenance, and testing of hardware and
software components.
The NAS Plan originally consisted of 82 separate projects among the functional
areas. The plan was expected to require $12 billion (1991 dollars) and ten
years to complete. To date 28 have been completed and 1 was canceled. The
remaining 53 projects are still under development in various stages of
completion. Current estimates at completion exceed $32 billion and a total of
20 years from inception.5
Brief descriptions, as detailed in a recent GAO report, of thirteen of the most
important projects in the original NAS Plan and still under development follow:
5 GAO/RCED-91-152, p 7.
Automation Projects
Advanced Automation System (AAS) -- The AAS is to provide a new automation
system that includes improved controller work stations, computer software, and
processors. The AAS will provide: the capacity to handle the projected traffic
load and capability to perform the new functions to be introduced into ATC into
the 21st century; increased productivity through introduction of new controller
workstations and displays; a high degree of reliability and availability; and the
capability for enhancement to perform other functions subsequently introduced
into the system6. The program is to implemented in five phases.
Flight Service Automation System (FSAS) -- This project is intended to improve
pilot access to weather information and NOTAMs, simplify flight plan filing, and
provide a flight service system that can handle projected increases in demand
for flight services without proportional increases in staff.7 This use of
automation is expected to yield significantly increased flight service personnel
productivity.
Communications Proiects:
Voice Switching and Control System (VSCS) -- This project is to provide a
voice communications system between air traffic controllers and flight crews
and between different air traffic control segments. The system will provide
intercom, interphone, and air/ground voice connections for air traffic control
operations in Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) and an Area Control
Facilities (ACF). The VSCS must satisfy the voice communications
6 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-1-9.
7 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-3-1.
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reconfiguration, service, quality, and availability needs of the ARTCC/ACF
users. The VSCS is expected to reduce lease costs, increase modularity and
growth capability, and increase controller productivity over current services.8
The system is expected to increase controller efficiency and allow safer
handling of anticipated increases in air traffic.
Radar Microwave Link (RML) Replacement and Expansion -- This project will
replace and expand the aging RML. The system consists of three major
subsystems to manage and transmit voice and data communications between
ATC facilities. It is expected to reduce costs and promote safety by providing an
effective, reliable voice and data service connecting ARTCCs, long-range
radars, and other air traffic facilities.9
Navigation and Landing Projects:
Microwave Landing System (MLS) -- In 1978 MLS was adopted by the ICAO as
a world standard to replace instrument landing systems (ILS) and to provide
precision approach capability where ILS will not function. MLS provides the
precision guidance that is expected to satisfy the full range of operational
requirements for all types of aircraft in all types of landing. MLS can improve
capacity by providing lower landing weather minimums which allows more flight
operations in poor weather, and by providing precision approach capability
where ILS is not possible. MLS features could be particularly beneficial in
multi-airport environments such as Chicago, New York or San Francisco. 10,11
8 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-1-7.
9 GAO/RCED-93-121 FS, p. 22.
10 Ibid.
11 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-4-4.
Surveillance Projects:
Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR-4) -- This project provides for long-range
surveillance radar, enroute navigation, air defense, and drug interdiction. The
system will reduce costs by substituting unmanned radar for old, hard-to-
maintain systems and by reducing the number of site operators required to run
the system. 12
Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3) Radar -- ASDE-3 will provide
radar surveillance of aircraft and airport service vehicles at high activity airports.
This system will enable controllers at busy airports to monitor ground activity of
aircraft and other vehicles under all weather conditions. The system can scan
the entire airport and focus on particular areas for increased scrutiny. It will
increase surface safety and collision avoidance by replacing aging and less
reliable radar equipment.13
Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-9) -- ASR-9 provides highly accurate
monitoring of aircraft movement and position within a 60 mile radius of the
airport terminal. The system will replace aging ASR-4/5/6 systems which are
hard to maintain and for which spare parts are in short supply. The system can
display aircraft and weather information simultaneously. It should increase
safety at busy airports by providing more accurate data to separate and control
movement of aircraft in and out of the terminal area.14
Mode Select (Mode S) -- Mode S will improve the surveillance capability of the
ATC radar beacon system. It will reduce signal interference between aircraft
12 GAO/RCED-93-121 FS, p. 22.
13 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-4-15.
14 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-4-13.
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and establish a clear message channel between the aircraft and ground
facilities. In addition, it provides the medium for a digital data-link which will be
used for exchanging information between aircraft, various ATC functions and
weather databases. Pilots will be able to access weather information
independent of air traffic controllers. It will also improve safety by identifying
aircraft location more accurately than with the current system.15
Weather Projects:
Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) -- This project will automatically
collect aviation-critical data (such as wind velocity, temperature, dew point,
altimeter setting, cloud height, and visibility). The system processes and
transmits weather data to pilots upon request, via synthesized computer voice.
It will improve safety at small airports without control towers and eliminates or
reduces errors at large airports. When integrated with the AWOS Data
Acquisition System and the Weather Message Switching System, it will make
near real-time weather available to pilots thereby improving safety and
efficiency.16
Central Weather Processor (CWP) -- This project improves the collection,
synthesis, and dissemination of weather information throughout the
national airspace to pilots, controllers, traffic management specialists and
meteorologists. The system also provides some meteorologists with automated
workstations which greatly enhance their ability to analyze rapidly changing,
potentially hazardous conditions. The system is intended to reduce weather-
related accidents and air traffic delays.17
15 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-4-12.
16 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-3-8.
17 Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, p. 2-3-2.
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The projects described above are only a sampling of the those undertaken in
the NAS Plan, but represent a spectrum of the more important systems targeted
for creation or improvement. Notably absent from this list is any mention of
satellite-based assets. At the time of the development of the original NAS Plan,
1981, mobile satellite communications had already been in use for several
years in maritime environments. Significant experimental successes had
already been accomplished in civil aeronautical satellite communications as
well. Military satellite communications were commonplace at the time. In
addition satellite-based navigation had been proven with the Navy's
operational Navsat program from the mid-1970s. The US Air Force had been
developing its Global Positioning System (GPS) concept since the early 1970s.
Both the Air Force and private industry had acquired extensive experience with
the prototype constellation of Block I Navstar GPS of satellites from the late
1970s. Indeed, the Air Force had authorized plans and funding to proceed with
a fully operational system of Block 11 satellites with production beginning in
1993. At the time of NAS Plan formulation GPS was expected to be fully
operational by 1989.18 Yet in 1981 the FAA did not identify any satellite-based
assets as being important to the NAS Plan.
The Capital Investment Plan
Although the NAS Plan was comprehensive for its day, there was no
expectation that the plan should be static. Normal development activities serve
to identify needs that had previously been unrecognized, or unlabeled.
Similarly technology developments can enable solutions that had not earlier
18 Aerospace America, July 1984, p. 42.
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been contemplated. Two examples of projects added in recognition of
legitimate needs, or enabled by new technology follow:
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) -- The system is intended to detect
windshear, gust fronts, wind shifts, microbursts and precipitation around
airports. The main benefit of the system is to promote safety by providing alerts
of hazardous weather conditions in terminal areas and of changing wind
conditions that influence runway usage. 19
GPS Monitors -- This project provides a monitor system to enable use of GPS
by civil aviation for supplemental enroute navigation and non-precision
approaches. This project is, by itself however, insufficient to obtain the benefits
that would accrue to GPS from precision approaches if it were enhanced.
While the NAS Plan was very ambitious in its objectives, the FAA quickly ran
into problems with development budgets and timelines. Deficiencies
uncovered in the course of development of NAS Plan projects identified new
projects that would be required to complement the original plan. Other projects
would also be required to stop the gaps produced by development delays. By
1990 the NAS Plan was sufficiently behind schedule and over budget that it
was renamed the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) to reflect its more expansive
scope.
An examination of the thirteen projects in the original NAS Plan which are still
included in the current CIP is illustrative of the extent of the problems the FAA
has encountered with its various system developments. Table 1 shows the
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19 GAO/RCED-93-121FS, p. 22.
differences in key schedule milestones between the 1983 NAS Plan and the
1992 CIP.
Table 1: Delays in Major Capital Investment Plan Projects20
First-site Implementation Last-site Implementation
Year of first-site Years Year of last-site Years
im lementation delayed im lementation delayed
83 NAS 91 CIP 92 CIP 83-92 83 NAS 91 CIP 92 CIP 83-92
______ lan plan
AAS 1990 1991 1991 1 1994 2001 2002 8
ARSR-4 1985 1993 1994 9 1995 1996 1996 1
ASDE-3 1987 1992 1993 6 1990 1994 1996 6
ASR-9 1985 1989 1989 4 1992 1993 1996 4
AWOS 1986 1989 1989 3 1990 1997 1997 7
CWP 1990 1991 1991 1 1991 1998 21 20
FSAS 1984 1991 1991 7 1989 1995 1995 6
MLS 1985 1997 1997 12 1999 2008 2008 9
Mode S 1986 1993 1993 7 1993 1996 1996 3
RML 1985 1986 1986 1 1989 1994 20 20
TDWR 22 1993 1993 21 21 1996 1996 21
VSCS 1989 1995 1995 6 1992 1997 1997 5
Avg. 5 5
Delay , I I _IaI
But if the schedule delays in Table 1 seem large, consider the magnitude of the
changes in unit costs for these equipment over the same intervals. Table 2
itemizes the relevant unit cost information for these systems.
On some of these project the news continues to deteriorate. In March, 1994 the
FAA again revised its estimate for completion of the AAS project. FAA
managers now expect that the project will require a total of between $6.5 billion
and $7.3 billion and an additional nine to 31 months to finish the project. The
project was originally to achieve its first installation in Seattle in 1990, but the
best guess now is 1998 for that milestone. This represents an increase in unit
20 GAO/RCED-93-121 FS, p. 27.21Being reevaluated; don't know last-site implementation date.
22TDWR was not included in the 1983 NAS Plan
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costs of 214% -- or two-thirds larger overrun than estimated as recently as one
year ago23.
Table 2: Changes in Unit Cost for 11 Major CIP Projects24
(in millions of 1993 dollars)
Project 83 F&E 83 83 F&E 93 F&E 93 93 F&E Percent
cost planned cost costs planned cost change
units index units index in unit
cost
AAS $2070 23 $90 $4703 23 $205 127
facilities facilities
ARSR-4 426 48 radars 8.9 383 39 radars 9.8 11
ASDE-3 83 21 radars 4.0 191 44 radars 4.3 10
ASR-9 931 96 radars 9.7 840 124 6.8 -30
radars
AWOS 161 700 units .23 230 737 units .31 35
FSAS 305 61 5.0 371 61 6.1 22
stations stations
MLS 1246 1250 1.0 2624 1280 2.1 105
systems systems
Mode S 487 197 2.5 473 137 3.5 40
systems systems
RML 26425 1000 .26 313 871 sites .36 38
sites
TDWR 55023 102 5.4 351 47 radars 7.5 38
_ radars ___
VSCS 259 25 units 10.3 1407 25 units 56.3 444
The FAA also finally added a CIP project in 1993, when GPS was actually
approaching initial operational capability, to more fully address the desired
capability of GPS for precision approaches and including reliability and
availability monitoring and differential signal generation.
23 Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1994, p 87B.24GAO/RCED-93-121 FS, p. 25.25 Cost data from 85 for RML and 87 for TDWR since earlier data are insufficient to calculate index.
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ICAO Modernization Plans - Future Air Navigation System (FANS)
The Special Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) was
established by the ICAO Council at the end of 1983 with the purpose of
identifying and assessing new concepts and technology applicable to air
navigation. The group purposefully considered satellite technology among the
options studied. Recommendations were to focus on developments suitable for
international civil aviation air navigation over a horizon of approximately 25
years. In May, 1988 the report of the fourth meeting of the FANS committee 26
identified three basic shortcomings of the current communication, navigation
and surveillance (CNS) systems around the world:
- propagation, accuracy and reliability of the world's current line-of-sight
systems are severely limited.
- practical impossibility to standardize installation and operations of current
CNS systems everywhere in the world.
- lack of digital air-ground data interchange and the limits of voice
communication systems insufficient to support the data streams required for
a modern automated traffic management system in the air or on the ground.
The committee went on to say that in order to respond to users' needs, new
systems should provide for:
- global communication from very low to very high altitudes including remote,
off-shore and oceanic areas.
- digital data interchange capability to exploit the automated capabilities of
airborne and ground-based systems.
26 Report of the Special Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems, 1988, p. 1.
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- navigation and approach aids for landing areas not equipped with precision
landing aids (i.e. ILS or MLS).27
At the Tenth Air Navigation Conference of the ICAO, in September, 1991, all
nations agreed that the future worldwide system of air navigation would be
based on CNS capabilities provided by satellite technology. While the specific
details of air traffic services would continue to be the responsibility of the
sovereign nations using the guidance provided by ICAO standard and
recommended practices (SARPs), leaders agreed that all nations would begin
to plan the transition to a common global CNS system.28
The systems identified for incorporation into FANS are detailed in Table 3.
FANS does not include automation, weather or maintenance and operations;
these functions are beyond the purview of the Special Committee on FANS.
Certainly the communication, navigation and surveillance functions, as well as
the procedures used by the controllers need to be standardized throughout the
world to obtain maximum safety and efficiency. The communication, navigation
and surveillance functions are the most immediately experienced by the flight
crews, and therefore the most crucial to seamless worldwide air traffic
management.
27 Report of the... FANS/4, p. 1.
28 National Challenges...for ATM, p 11.
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Table 3: Future Air Navigation System Eq ipment Architecture29
Domestic Airspace Oceanic Airspace
Air-Ground
Communication_
- Voice - Existing VHF Radio - New Global Satellite
Service
- HF Radio to be phased
out
- Data - New Global Satellite - New Global Satellite
Service Service
Mode S in High Density
Terminal Areas
Radio navigation
- Areawide - Navigation performance - Navigation performance
req't in lieu of technology req't in lieu of technology
standard standard
. GNSS assumed - GNSS assumed
- VOR/DME and NDB to be
phased out.
- Precision Approach - MLS to replace ILS as
international standard
Air Traffic Surveillance
- Ground - SSR Modes A, C and S - Satellite based ADS
- Supplemental Satellite-
based ADS.
- Primary radar optional for
S weather and defense
- Airborne - TCAS Assumed - TCAS Assumed
ICAO did not adopt, nor did the FANS committee recommend, the use of GNSS
for precision approaches. The capability of the GPS satellite navigation
systems to provide navigation accuracies sufficient to perform these functions --
at least to Category I precision approaches -- is now thought to be practical
within a couple years or so. Although questions persist as to the optimal
approach to provide the correction signals and integrity monitoring to achieve
the required characteristics, since there is substantial experimental data that the
capability will be practical and economical it seems likely that if the Air
Navigation Conference were meeting today, they would also confirm the use of
GNSS for these purposes as well as those stated in Table 3.
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2911bid., p. 12.
It is apparent that ICAO has made a concerted effort to avoid selecting specific
technical approaches to accomplishing the various functions. With the
exception of SSR Mode S, TCAS and MLS which are technical standards that
have existed for years and are already embodied in hardware, the FANS suite
does not specify particular technology. The satellite-based technology is
selected to treat the limitations identified in the committee's report from 1988
and still leaves numerous options, as shown in Appendix B to this report.
Comparison of CIP and FANS
The purposes of the CIP and FANS definitions are substantially different. The
CIP is a detailed planning document used to define and justify to Congress the
hardware development and acquisition projects the FAA manages in order to
modernize and operate the ATM system under the continuing stress of daily
operations and capacity constraints. The FANS definition, on the other hand, is
a more strategic view of the CNS technologies to be adopted in order to reach
the next plateau of traffic management capability. Definition of FANS would, of
course, require considerable more detail and much finer parsing in order to
either appropriate public funds or implement the technical details heretofore
undefined.
Nonetheless the approaches that have been adopted under the auspices of the
ICAO Special Committee on FANS were known to the US since FAA personnel
have been full and active members in that Committee. FAA participation was
provided by working-level people primarily out of the FAA Systems
Development division. Yet the 1992 CIP, which is the latest complete plan
available, has only three satellite-based system projects (Oceanic Satellite
Communications, Satellite Communications Circuits System and GPS
Monitors). GPS, while possessing the basic capability required for enroute
navigation stipulated in the FANS concept (as well as accuracy suitable for non-
precision approaches, which was not specified), does not have the reliability,
availability, or integrity assurances that are required for a component of the civil
ATM system. The FAA has done nothing (until within the last year or so) to
prepare to provide these features to the nation's airspace users. Instead, they
have continued to focus on system modernization plans some of which are
obsolescent at more than twelve years old -- and they continue to fail even at
those modernization projects.
What is wrong with the management and organization of the FAA that this can
be so? How is the FAA organized to implement the GNSS provisions of the
FANS concept? Is there any reason to believe GNSS projects will fare any
better than the CIP projects identified in Tables 1 and 2? What can the FAA and
the rest of the community do to ensure the success of GNSS implementation?
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CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
PROCESSES AT FAA
This chapter describes the organization of the Federal Aviation Administration.
There are two main players in the conduct of the FAA's affairs and particularly
with respect to its modernization efforts: Systems Operations and Systems
Development. Within these two major divisions, there are many other sections
and groups that are involved in new development activities. The organization is
complex and some effort is required to comprehend the several offices that
contribute to ATM modernization as relates to GPS/GNSS. Two key players
within System Operations (Air Traffic Service and the Flight Standards Service)
and three groups in System Development (NAS Development, Systems
Engineering Service and R&D Service) and their roles and responsibilities are
discussed in some detail. Several points become evident in the following
examination:
- The organization is complex.
- Organizational boundaries are formed along strong functional lines.
- Many participants in development efforts do not understand who the other
participants are.
- Many participants do not fully understand the development process nor do
they understand their own, or other participants', responsibilities in the
process.
This chapter also describes the two important formal processes in the
management of new system acquisition: the Acquisition Policy and the Capital
Investment Plan determination process. Several observations are drawn from
the investigation of these processes:
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- The formal acquisition policy is a fairly recent addition to FAA management
processes
- Many participants do not fully understand the acquisition policy.
- Discipline in performing according to the acquisition policy is lacking, but is
improving.
- A highly formalized planning and budgeting process has been defined to
allocate budget to CIP projects and to define new projects.
- The new project definition process separates responsibility for mission
needs analysis between the main functional divisions so their is no clear
responsibility for Operations to define their needs.
Finally in this chapter discusses the background, education and culture of
personnel within the two major divisions of the agency. The examination
reveals that
- There are strong cultural differences between the major organizational
groups.
- Management culture favors an organizational arrangement that tends to
emphasize boundaries between groups.
FAA Organizational Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
This section describes the organizational arrangement of the FAA and the main
contributors to GPS/GNSS development activities: Air Traffic, Flight Standards,
NAS Development, Systems Engineering, and the R&D Service.
FAA Organizational Arrangement
The FAA organizational structure displays very strong functional bias. The main
divisions within the FAA are System Operations and System Development.
There are also several other divisions to provide management and business
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support services to the agency. These are depicted in the FAA Organization
Chart in Figure 1. This is the highest level of functional differentiation in the
agency and is profound. The Operations people are predominantly air traffic
controllers and operatives of other types; they have few, diffused responsibilities
for new developments. System Developers are mostly engineers, scientists
and analysts; they have no responsibilities for daily system operations.
System Operations is the much larger of the two major divisions. The major
power centers are located one level below the division level Executive Directors
-- at the Associate Administrator level. One senior manager likened the
Associate Administrators to "feudal lords -- able to pass out resources and
perquisites at a whim." Managers at the Associate Administrator level are
typically long-time FAA employees and have been in their jobs for several years
or more. Officials at the next higher level of management above Associate
Administrator, for comparison, are more mobile although those positions are not
political appointments. Of course the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator are political appointees and as such they tend to move through
their post fairly quickly. One fellow stated that the average tenure of an
Administrator is less than 2 1/2 years over the last twenty years.
All the Associate Administrators are either in the Operations or Development
Divisions. In other words, the real work of the FAA and most of its employees
are subsumed within these two divisions.
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FIGURE 1: FAA Organization Arrangement
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System Operations Organizations Critical to GPS/GNSS.
Systems Operations is the mainstay of the FAA. It is responsible for all the daily
operations of the agency, including air traffic control, control procedures,
facilities installation and maintenance, regulation and certification standards for
aircraft, airmen and facilities. In a very real sense everyone else at the agency
is necessary to help the Operations staff provide effective services to the flying
public. Together with the few hundred administrative people at FAA
Headquarters, Operations accounts for 94% of the permanent personnel in the
agency.
Of the several Associate Administrators in this division, one of them controls
over haff of the entire FAA workforce -- the Associate Administrator for Air Traffic.
Systems Operations -- Air Traffic Service
In addition to managing the operational air traffic controllers, this section has
groups responsible for Plans and Requirements, Program Management, Rules
and Procedures, and System Effectiveness. These are jointly responsible for
planning ATM service, managing ongoing and new ATM programs, developing
new ATM procedures, measuring and ensuring ATM system effectiveness and
actually managing the nation's air traffic. One might jump to the conclusion that
these groups, in some combination, would be responsible for all aspects of ATM
modernization including GPS/GNSS development. Based on lines of
responsibility at FAA, however, ATM system development and operation is
much more complicated than this.
There is an important feature in the lines of ATM responsibility among FAA
staffs. As one manager within the Air Traffic section of Operations described it
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to me -- Air Traffic is responsible for the ground-based components of the ATM
system. Airborne assets relating to ATM are deemed to be the responsibility of
the Flight Standards Service which is another arm of the Systems Operations
Division (refer to Figure 1). It would be more accurate, perhaps, to describe Air
Traffic groups as responsible for the communication and surveillance functions
(whose equipment and displays are mostly on the ground); Flight Standards is
responsible for the navigation and landing functions (whose equipment is also
mostly on the ground but whose displays are almost entirely in the cockpit).
Systems Operations -- Flight Standards
Thus it is the Flight Standards group that is logically responsible for defining the
need, or being the sponsor for satellite-based navigation systems. Yet this
responsibility was evidently not explicitly assigned, nor clearly understood.
The fact that GPS/GNSS did not conform with any one of the traditional system
segments as defined by the existing system architecture (i.e. ground-based, vs.
cockpit-based), resulted in GPS/GNSS being essentially ignored by the agency
for years as it was being developed by the DOD and as the civil aviation
industry prepared to take advantage of the robust services promised by the
system. A key manager in the Flight Standards section described the vigorous
demands for satellite-based services originating from the airlines, the
international community and other airspace users as stimulating him to
volunteer to perform the role of GPS system sponsor within the FAA. He clearly
felt thrust into the role by default, in other words by a clear and glaring need that
was not being met by anyone. Although he now regards the territory as his
own, it is not clear that he should have understood it to be his responsibility from
the outset. The responsibilities of the various groups are simply not stated
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clearly. Even now, though many people understand Flight Standards to be
responsible for GPS, it is not widely understood within the agency that this
group is responsible for defining needs related to space-based communication
and navigation. Part of the reason is because people at FAA think so much in
terms of system technology solutions rather than operational needs. This issue
will be discussed more in Chapter 4.
System Development Groups Critical to GPS/GNSS Development
There are two other Associate Administrators from the Systems Development
division that play important roles in the development of new systems and in the
fielding of GNSS/GPS.
System Development -- NAS Development
The NAS Development section is responsible for acquisition management of
those items identified as standard components of the NAS. This group is
essentially responsible for managing the acquisition projects that form the
Capital Investment Plan (CIP). This group is responsible for defining detailed
specifications, qualifying and selecting contractors in concert with other FAA
business groups to design, fabricate and install the equipment, and for
managing the contractor performance. Interestingly, the GNSS/GPS
component which, despite the fact that it is already certified by the FAA for
enroute and non-precision approach navigation and thus is a basic piece of the
NAS, has no program office in the NAS Development division. The fact that
GPS was developed, tested and is today being maintained and operated by the
DOD is the explanation managers give for lack of GPS oversight in the NAS
Development division.
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System Engineering & Development -- System Engineering Service
GPS does not meet all the requirements of GNSS as defined by FANS. The US
DOD has no plans for further developments of GPS for purposes of civil
navigation. Thus, further development of various assets is required to satisfy
the deficiencies of GPS with respect to reliability, availability and integrity
monitoring and to enhance navigation accuracy for more robust navigation
service. This further development is currently being performed by the other key
division in System Development. The System Engineering & Development
section is responsible for working with users (i.e. airlines, general aviation, and
the flying public) and other agency organizations (e.g., Air Traffic Plans and
Requirements, Air Traffic System Management, and Flight Standards Service)
to define functional needs, propose alternative hardware, software or
procedural solutions, conduct trade studies among the alternatives and
recommend an approach to satisfy the need. The work of this section tends to
be exploratory; it could be described as applied research or exploratory
development rather than system development. Typically, when a project
matures to the system development stage and receives formal Facilities and
Equipment (F&E) funding authorization it transfers from the Systems
Engineering & Development to the NAS Development division.
A GPS/CNS Systems Office was created within the Systems Engineering &
Development section in the autumn of 1993. This office was established
primarily to be a high-level management coordinating office for all satellite-
based communication, navigation and surveillance activities at FAA. GPS is the
most urgent and visible of these at the moment, but other initiatives are also
moving along. This office does not have responsibility for specific development
actions, but works to coordinate the other diverse offices involved at the agency.
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The fact that this office was necessary is evidence of the complexity of FAA's
organization as relates to new satellite-based ATM systems development.
The essential work of the Systems Engineering & Development section as
applied to the details of new system development, such as GPS/GNSS, is
accomplished by the Systems Engineering Service and the R&D Service.
System Engineering & Development -- System Engineering Service
The Systems Engineering Service (ASE) is responsible for supporting internal
FAA sponsor of new system requirements through the Mission Needs Analysis.
The group is essential to the successful completion of engineering trade
studies, which it manages in concert with the R&D Service, the sponsor and
other offices within the agency. Representation on many of the ICAO
committees originates in this group.
System Engineering & Development -- Research & Development Service
The Satellite Navigation Program Office is in the R&D Service (ARD). Since
GPS was not a civil development program, the FAA has until quite recently had
little influence on OPS specifications or operations although they have been
active observers of the DOD developments over the last several years. What
little interest was evidenced by the FAA in GPS development was centered in
the R&D Service.
Even though GPS has been in development for 15 years, the Dept. of
Transportation, of which the FAA is a part, reached an accord with DOD only
this year regarding joint operation and access to the system.1 The
announcement of the accord came as a surprise to most of the aviation
1 Aviation Week, January 3, 1994, p. 32.
community who expected the DOD to maintain exclusive control over the
system. After a six month study, a DOT/DOD task force determined that a joint
Executive Board would be the most effective means of balancing civil and
military needs. Indications are strong that the clamor from civil, and in particular
international, users (who prefer that GPS be managed by an international
body), rather than the FAA were deciding influences behind this agreement.
Observations Regarding Organizational Fit and GPS/GNSS
The advent of a new system approach or technology, such as that presented by
satellite-based resources, can cause the patterns of organizational
responsibility to break down. Some, perhaps many, people at FAA think of the
division of responsibilities between sections within the Operations division as
based on whether the related systems are on the ground or in the airplane.
When the situation develops in which a new system does not conform to these
patterns, such as when the displays are in the airplane and the major
equipment is in space, ownership and responsibility for the concept can either
be neglected or lost entirely. There is strong evidence that the knowledge and
expertise of GPS systems resides primarily with the R&D Service rather than in
any Operations group. There is further evidence that since there is an
incomplete or imperfect fit between traditional Operations group responsibilities
and GPS/GNSS, internal FAA sponsorship of GPS/GNSS was only belatedly
accomplished. The expertise that resided in the R&D Service was not
effectively shared between Operations and Development. The inference, then,
is that if, in the absence of updated formal operational requirements, someone
from Operations does not step up to argue forcefully for a particular operational
need, there is no program sponsorship and the organization as a whole does
not get "switched on" to accomplish anything very purposeful. In other words,
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regardless of how sensible or imminent a potential solution might be, the
Operations division is responsible for its own operational needs; it must be
willing and able to stand up for its needs, articulate them persuasively and
maintain a commitment to the result.
FAA Acquisition Policy
Confusion originating in organizational responsibility will inevitably have
serious consequences for smoothly accomplishing any group's objectives. Any
such confusion can only be compounded when complicated procurement
actions must also conform to the dictates of the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Many of the CIP projects can be classified as potentially complicated
procurements subject to the needs of competitive bidding, rigorous alternatives
analysis and multiple reviews by managers and decision makers. Major
acquisitions in the Federal government can become complicated to the point of
inscrutability if not carefully prescribed and communicated so that all
participants in the process understand their roles and the events that must
transpire to bring a program to fruition.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has had procedures in place for
years to guide the various executive departments through procurement
activities. OMB Circular A-109 is the document which provides overarching
guidance to the other departments. It is typical for agencies with large
procurement activities to tailor the demands of A-109 to the particular
circumstances of each agency. The FAA, however, in spite of acquisition
actions sometimes stretching into the billion of dollars did not develop an
acquisition policy to control their activities until very recently. The FAA was
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roundly criticized for years by GAO and Congress 2,3 for not using a systematic
acquisition management process. As FAA managers faced more frequent
frustrations from NAS development projects gone awry and with numerous
recommendations from various stakeholders to develop a rigorous
development process, the agency developed and enacted a formal policy for
acquisition management. In March, 1993 the Acting Administrator signed and
put into effect the FAA's Acquisition Policy -- FAA Order 1810.1F.
FAA Order 1810.1F -- The FAA Version of OMB A-109
The stated objectives of the policy are to achieve:
(1) An integrated management framework for translating well-justified, approved
mission needs into stable, affordable acquisitions.
(2) A rigorous, event-oriented management process for acquiring quality
systems, supplies and services that emphasizes sound acquisition planning,
active involvement of users and sponsors, and effective risk management by
both Government and industry.
(3) A disciplined acquisition management structure and process with short,
clearly defined lines of responsibility, authority and accountability. This
structure should encourage continuity of program management in each
acquisition phase.
(4) Active involvement of users and sponsors in the development and evolution
of operational requirements and in the planning and execution of
operational testing.4
The key element of the FAA's policy, Order 1810.1 F, incorporates the essential
flow defined in OMB Circular A-109 and consists of five separate phases. The
event-oriented flow is characterized by four key decision points (KDPs) that
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2 GAO/RCED-91-152.
3GAO/RCED-92-136BR.
4 FAA Order 1810.1F, p 1-2.
must be transited in sequence for a project to proceed from conception to full
production and on into the field. Key decision points and the general nature of
activities occurring between decision points are outlined in Figure 2.
OMB A-109 Major System Acquisition Process
Determine Mission Needs
Key Decision Point 1
KDP 1 Approval of the mission needs statement starts the major
system acquisition process by granting authority to explore
alternative system design concepts.
Identify and Explore
Alternative Design Concepts 2
Key Decision Point 2
Advancement to competitive test/demonstration phase mayKDP 2 be approved when the agency's mission need and program
objectives are reaffirmed and when alternative system
design concepts are selected.
Demonstrate Alternative Design Concepts,
Including prototype, testing & evaluation l
Key Decision Point 3
Reconfirmation of mission need and program objectivesKDP 3 >and verification that the chosen system design concept(s)
Is sound and risk Is acceptable, agency head then author-
Izes the next phase.
Production, Including independent testing ®
Key Decision Point 4
KDP 4 Following satisfactory test results and reconfirmation ofmission need and program objectives the agency head
may authorize full production.
Full Production
Figure 2: FAA's Major System Acquisition Process is Derived from
0MB A-1095
The five project phases described here and the purposeful decisions taken
between each step are designed to ensure that appropriate alternatives are
considered and that all reasonable preparations have been accomplished
before proceeding to the next phase. Evolving as it does from the OMB policy
statement, Order 1810.1 F takes benefit of the huge body of experience
gathered at the Dept. of Defense and other agencies that have been
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5 GAO/T-RCED-93-36.
responsible for major acquisition programs over many years. While the origins
of the policy do not guarantee trouble-free acquisition programs, they do lend a
large measure of credence to the policy as having built upon an accumulation
of experience over diverse situations. This is a very thorough and systematic
process when conscientiously applied and carefully examined at decision
reviews.
The following subsections describe the development process in more detail.
Decision Authority
The decision authority for each KDP depends upon the acquisition "level"
defined at project inception. "Levels" are essentially determined by the dollar
magnitude and the technical risk inherent in the project. The appropriate
project level is one of the issues determined at KDP-1. Level 1 projects, for
example, are large scale projects to acquire new or replacement items and
often involve development of new technology. Decision authority for all KDPs
for Level 1 projects is retained by the Dept. of Transportation Acquisition
Executive -- an executive explicitly assigned this duty by the Secretary of
Transportation. Decision responsibility for lower level projects is delegated
from DOT to FAA and hence, depending on project level, down to the Associate
Administrator for the sponsoring or the performing organization . In all cases,
though, an acquisition executive at the FAA (FAE)reviews and approves all
project milestones before proceeding the Transportation Acquisition Executive.
Acquisition Review Committee
The FAA Acquisition Executive also has benefit of the Acquisition Review
Committee (ARC) -- a senior management group responsible for advising the
FAE at key decision points concerning the readiness of programs to proceed to
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the next phase of acquisition. The ARC is composed of the Executive Directors
of System Operations and of Systems Engineering and Development, all the
Associate Administrators, and the Assistant Administrators for Information
Technology and for Budget and Accounting. 6 The membership of the ARC, thus
includes the entire senior management related to system operations or new
system development. It explicitly includes all Associate Administrators and thus
incorporates the major power centers at the agency.
Interestingly, while the ARC's function is to advise the FAA Acquisition
Executive (often the Administrator), it is chaired by the Executive Director of
Acquisition and Safety Oversight. The normal duties of the Executive Director of
Acquisition and Safety Oversight are to administer the process outlined by the
new acquisition policy. This is a program management "watch dog" role in the
sense that this group has general management oversight responsibilities.
These individuals are responsible for ensuring that the program staffs have the
knowledge and tools they need to implement the acquisition policy. They are
not, however, responsible for actually acquiring new hardware, or services.
Those duties fall to the program managers and their staffs who work in the
Directorate for System Development. So we see that the ARC is chaired by the
manager with the most general acquisition management responsibilities rather
than by any one of the particular agency interests.
This situation is analogous to employing a mediator to manage the acquisition
of some new product or service. It insulates the primary developers from the
real and intermadiate customer. It also removes the internal customer, the
internal sponsor, from the urgent need to directly and immediately represent its
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6 FAA Order 1810.1F, p 1-28.
need for a new operational capability. The ARC is a comprehensive advisory
body that possesses all the functional expertise necessary to advise the
acquisition executive on virtually any topic relevant to new system development
and acquisition. If this body functions equitably and openly it should be a
powerful and positive force in the acquisition process by aiding the acquisition
executive in making the best possible decisions with the information available.
But it must not diminish the responsibility for the FAA to define and persist in its
statement of operational capability.
CIP Planninq Process
If the FAA now has formal procedures in place to rationally and economically
acquire the new systems needed for maintaining and modernizing the national
airspace, how does it decide which systems to acquire? Where are the
requirements analyses and trade studies done that substantiate specific
acquisition programs? Where are new procedures, rather than new hardware
or software systems, considered as alternatives to satisfy an operational
requirement? What determines which program make it into the CIP in any given
year? These questions are investigated in this section.
The FAA has instituted an integrated Capital Investment Plan planning and
budgeting process effective with the 1994 CIP and the FY 1996 budget which is
described in detail in a process description document published in September,
1993. The process consumes a full year commencing in June. A flow chart
depicting the steps in the process is included as Appendix C. A brief
description of the important institutional aspects of the process follows.
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"The CIP summarizes Facilities and Equipment (F&E) programs that the FAA
intends to pursue over a 15 planning horizon in addressing key concerns of
the NAS. The CIP embodies the phased plan for the evolution of the
existing NAS through an orderly deployment of new products and
technologies to meet mission need. New F&E programs are identified
through a continuous process of mission needs analysis which leads to
development/approval of a Mission Need Statement (MNS). Approved
MNSs then enter the competition with existing programs for F&E funding
each year, in the F&E budget process."7
It is imperative to have an authenticated Mission Need Statement in order to
enter the competition for F&E funds via the CIP planning process.
System Engineering/Operational Analysis Teams (SEOAT)
The CIP planning and budgeting process consists of three phases: (1) policy
guidance, (2) system engineering/operational analysis, and (3) resource
allocation. Each phase is initiated by a group of managers working together as
the System Engineering/Operational Analysis Team (SEOAT). The SEOAT is
composed of the managers of the following offices: Facility Systems
Engineering, Air Traffic Plans and Requirements, NAS Transition and
Implementation, System Engineering, Flight Standards, and Office of Budget.
In the policy guidance phase, based on their review of FAA strategic planning
documents and other source material, the SEOAT drafts preliminary guidance
papers to orient the numerous project sponsors and other process participants
to the global and strategic objectives of the agency. After review and resolution
of controversial issues by the Administrator, approved guidance is passed back
to the SEOAT, which initiates the next phase -- system engineering and
operational analysis.
7 FAA Capital Investment Planning Process, p. 1.
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The major work of the system engineering and operational analysis phase is
accomplished by the SEOAT and the Functional Work Groups (FWG). The
SEOAT explains and interprets the CIP planning guidance to the Functional
Work Groups. The SEOAT also develops rating criteria to be used in evaluating
the relative merits of various projects. The Functional Work Groups use the
evaluation criteria to rate all projects within their functional area. FWGs are
established in each of seven functional areas: automation, communications,
surveillance, weather, navigation/landing, facilities, and mission support. The
FWGs are comprised of representatives from Air Traffic, Airway Facilities,
Regulation and Certification and Systems Engineering. FWGs are responsible
for rating projects in terms of their mission objective, system engineering
coherence, benefit/cost, and operations impact. The functional rating provided
by the FWGs are then used by the SEOAT, along with the planning guidance, to
produce a relative ranking of all the projects in the CIP. The planning process
description defines the SEOAT is the final determinant of project rankings: "The
SEOAT will be responsible for the overall rating of the various projects and their
contribution to the corporate guidance and issue resolution provided by the
[Administrator]."8 The second phase ends with the approval of the SEOAT
overall evaluations and ratings by the CIP Steering Committee, which is
composed of the senior executive management of the agency.
In the budgeting phase the Functional Work Groups are given functional target
levels they are required to meet. Relevant financial and program data is
provided to the FWGs and the SEOAT to assist them in allocating budget.
Budget is allocated based on the ability to execute the project in a given year
consistent with the priority recommendations of the SEOAT. Project Work
8FAA Capital Investment Planning Process, p. 6.
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Breakdown Structures must be modified in accordance with any budget revision
that occurs as a result of this process. Finally the SEOAT compiles the
individual functional baselines from the separate FWGs into a final CIP financial
baseline for review by the CIP Steering Committee.
Reference to Appendix C shows that the planning cycle continues through June
with the submission of the budget for two years hence to the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation. One of the last parallel events is approval of
Mission Need Statements, which is a curious design since we saw in Figure 2
that the MNS should be the first step in the acquisition process as prescribed by
Order 1810.1F. That is, an authenticated MNS is required to proceed at any
stage of CIP planning. The Planning Process document is quite explicit on this;
"MNSs that have not been authenticated will not be assigned an MNS number
and, as such, will not be included as workload for the MNA [mission needs
analysis] team."9 What could the explanation be for this apparent
contradiction? The terminology used on the chart for Appendix C is imprecise;
the cut-offs at the end of the planning cycle and just before submittal to the
Secretary of Transportation refer to Key Decision Points, rather than Mission
Need Statements per se, that must be passed before a given project can move
into the next phase and for which its future budgeting might depend. In other
words, every project needs an approved MNS to enter the CIP, and some
projects need to transit a subsequent decision point in order to proceed through
the process. Those projects must pass through the relevant decision gate by
the time indicated or fall out of the system.
9FAA Capital Investment Planning Process, p. 12.
Mission Needs Analysis Teams (MNATs)
Each of the five phases of activity outlined in and required by FAA Order
1810.1F in Figure 2 are crucial to the successful completion of a complex
acquisition program. The objectives, activities and products of each phase of
the process are described in detail in the Order.
Consideration of Non-Materiel Solutions
The first phase, i.e. Phase 0, which occurs before the first decision milestone is
particularly important in initiating any ATM modernization project. Note that it is
Phase 0 that establishes and authenticates the Mission Needs Statement which
then becomes the cornerstone of all subsequent acquisition activities. It is also
in this phase that non-materiel approaches, such as revising air traffic control
procedures, are considered to satisfy any given need. The stated objectives of
Phase 0 are:
- Identify needs in terms of deficiencies or shortfalls in existing mission
capability or in terms of technological opportunities to perform assigned
tasks more effectively.
- Determine if deficiencies can be resolved with low-cost, non-materiel means
that do not involve a new development or acquisition program.
- If the need cannot be satisfied by low-capital, non-materiel means, develop
and quantify mission need for a new acquisition in a mission need statement
that is validated and sponsored by an FAA user organization. 10
It should be noted that while Phase 1, Concept Exploration and Alternatives
Analysis, also requires consideration of "all reasonable alternative
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approaches," the emphasis is clearly on potential hardware and software
solutions, rather than other non-materiel forms, such as new or revised
procedures. Thus Phase 0 activities are particularly important in determining
the type of project that should be instituted to satisfy a need.
Definition of a Project Sponsor and MNAT Composition
There are several key people required to effectively accomplish a Phase 0
Mission Need Development phase in addition to the obvious "Originator." The
process requires, for example a "Sponsor' from the cognizant group within FAA
with operational oversight responsibility of the area. In the case of GPS/GNSS
as we discovered earlier in the chapter, the appropriate sponsor is the Flight
Standards Service. The other members of the group that must perform in order
to produce an authenticated MNS are from System Engineering and
Development (ASD) and include representatives from Facility System
Engineering (AFE), NAS System Engineering (ASE), and Operation Research
(AOR). Together, this group comprises the Mission Need Analysis Team
(MNAT). The MNAT is intended to provide the appropriate people, skill mix,
tools, data and expertise to bridge from the Sponsor's preliminary description of
mission need, to a more precise description of required operational capability,
functionality, performance characteristics and performance attributes
appropriate for initiating system concept development activities after KDP-1
approval.
Composition of the MNAT varies to some extent depending on the nature of the
preliminary need defined by the Sponsor and depending on the analyses
accomplished by the Team. Nonetheless it is significant that another group
within ASD -- the Research and Development Service -- is aot typically included
53
in the initial MNAT. This omission of R&D personnel, who are most familiar with
emerging technology and who can most realistically judge technical
capabilities, can bias a program, either toward or away from advanced
technology solutions, during the critical mission need determination phase.
The activities to be conducted during Phase 0 are depicted in Figure 3.
Acqusition Policy
Guidance
Originator Sponsor reviews, ASD logs inIdentifies 0 authenticates need, preliminary MNS,
Need approves preliminary MNS assigns number.
MVNA Team
identifies data
need
Agency review Sponsor and ASD conduct letter to sponsor
of MVNS MVNA to support MNS- with data
requirments
MVNA Team Sponsor MNS to ACQ for KDP-1
revision approval processing
Figure 3: Mission Need Statement Development and Approval
Process11
Several features of the MNS development process bear discussion. First, while
the MNAT will accomplish the needs analysis, it is obvious that the
responsibility for acquiring the basic data with which to perform the analysis is
the responsibility of the Sponsor. This arrangement places the burden for
proceeding with any program on the shoulders of the organization with the
need. On paper at least, this arrangement tends to ensure "ownership" of the
11 FAA Capital Investment Planning Process, p. 13.
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process by keeping responsibility for the moving the process along with the
internal FAA using group, i.e. the Sponsor. Secondly there is an evident
transfer or work responsibility after the basic data requirements have been
satisfied by the Sponsor; the bulk of the needs analysis is shifted to the various
groups from Systems Engineering & Development. They become the "actual"
needs analysts and they are often overworked. The CIP Planning Process
document actually explicitly defines procedures for resolving conflicts and
prioritizing analyses among projects when analysts can not accomplish their
backlog of work. A large backlog is the normal state of affairs for these analysts
as evidenced by the standing procedure for dispute resolution. One manager in
Systems Engineering told me that the manpower available for performing these
functions is about half that required to do a competent job on all the analyses
requested.
The partitioning of work between Systems Engineering & Development (ASD)
and the various sponsors is on the face of it sensible but perhaps unnecessarily
divides the group's activities. In the seventh box of Figure 3 the process
requires Sponsor and ASD to conduct mission needs analysis. But the
Sponsor and ASD are the MNA T, yet they are not referred to as a team. The
suggestion is strong that teamwork breaks down at this stage (and perhaps
never existed to begin with). Given that personnel in ASD working Mission
Needs Analyses are overloaded and that the sponsoring organization takes
little responsibility after developing an initial statement of need, it is evident that
System Engineering & Development takes over responsibility for subsequent
development phases. Systems Operations personnel are not major participants
in subsequent stages in spite of their sponsorship role. The planning and
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budgeting process document does not name the MNAT members, nor identify
the team leader. The MNA T may be a team in name only.
Education and Culture
The staff of System Development, including NAS Development (AND) and
System Engineering & Development (ASD) includes a large fraction of
engineers and scientists as well as other analytic and professional disciplines.
Most of these people have some higher education and many have
baccalaureate degrees, or better. The staff of the Systems Operations
directorate, however, is derived from the ranks of air traffic controllers and
systems maintenance technicians. These people have much less frequently
experienced higher education and seldom possess college degrees. An FAA
executive described to me a recent management search case: a person was
sought to fill a Senior Executive Service (i.e. a high-level, executive
management) position from the ranks of the System Operations directorate. Of
the 16 applicants, only two had any college experience; none had a degree of
any kind.
In addition, the headquarters staff of System Operations is often populated by
field personnel on a three-year tour of duty. The lack of continuity in
maintaining mission needs and the need for time to understand current
developments-in-process and to develop working relationships with R&D
personnel inhibits or prevents efficient progress in system development
activities.
Personality surveys can also reveal something about the nature of the
organization. The Myers-Briggs personality survey, for example, characterizes
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personality types along four different dimensions: 1)introvert (1) - extrovert (E)
relationship style; 2) sensing (S) - intuition (N) information gathering style; 3)
thinking (T) - feeling (F) decision making style; and 4) perceiving (P) -
judgmental (J) priority preference. Myers-Briggs surveys conducted at the FAA
Management Training Institute discovered that 70% of managers at the FAA
are:
- Introverts -- rather than extroverts (I vs. E)
- Sensing -- rather than intuitive (S vs. N)
- Thinking -- rather than feeling (T vs. F)
- Judging -- rather than perceiving (J vs. P)
This is a remarkably high percentage. No greater than 5% of the general US
population is categorized in this category although nearly 24% of the 849
managers attending business short courses in one study possessed these
characteristics.12 Individuals with ISTJ characteristics are frequently practical,
orderly, matter-of-fact, logical, realistic and dependable. They make up their
own minds as to what should be accomplished and work toward it steadily,
regardless of protests or distractions.13
Organizational structure has been shown to correlate with the personality types
dominant in an organization. Kilmann and Mitroff14 summarized their findings
on managers' Myers-Briggs personality types and preferred organizational
structure, which is tabulated here.
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12 Margerison & Lewis, p 15.
13 Myers.
14 Margerison & Lewis, p. 17.
Table 4: Organizational Preferences for Various Personality
Types 15
Areas Types
Practical (ST) Social (SF) Idealistic (NF) Theoretical
(NT)
Structure Practical Friendly, Completely Complex
bureaucratic, Hierarchical but decentralized, organization
well-defined open no clear lines of flexibility,
hierarchy, authority, no changing
central leader central leader authority, task
forces
Emphasis in Task Human qualities Humanitarian, Goals, clients,
Interactions orientation, of people doing general concem effect of
complete work as for development environment
control, individuals of employees
specificity, fixed
rules
Organizational Productivity Good Personal and Macro-
Goals work flows interpersonal humanitarian economic,
I _relations theoretical
Margerison and Lewis synopsize these results with the following remarks that
are relevant to the majority of personality types in the FAA:
"...ST's prefer an authoritarian and bureaucratic organization with a well defined
hierarchy and central leadership. The reasons for this stem from the nature
of the work preference types. The NF person requires a high degree of
autonomy and freedom in order to exercise his preferences and feeling. He
prefers making contact with people regardless of their level and organization
before he can work effectively. The ST type on the other hand, prefers a well
defined structure because this enables him to get on with what he enjoys
doing -- practical, everyday matters at hand. Discussions with people about
feeling and intuition are often seen by ST people to be a waste of time and
barriers to getting the task done."
In considering the FAA it may be asked not whether talking about feeling and
intuition in necessary or important, but whether the preponderance of ISTJ
types might not create overwhelming favor for a centralized organizational
structure that is governed by fixed rules and that actually inhibits dialog across
group boundaries. An organizational environment can easily be fashioned in
15 Kilmann & Mitroff after Margerison & Lewis, p. 18.
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which individuals become so directed toward their immediate job, they do not
stop to converse with their customer. Kilmann and Mitroff conclude that:
"To summarize ST's can be characterized as real-time, operational-technical,
problem solvers; NT's are future-time, strategic-technical problem
generators; and SF's are real-time operational-people problem solvers.
Compared to intuitives, the planning horizon of sensing people is extremely
short. In the extreme sensing people are not interested in planning at all.
They do not believe that one can talk sensibly about the future because one
can not sense it directly."16
The contention here is not that FAA managers do not plan but that their
preferences are for other sorts of work and that the organization and attitudes
within the organization value other work, specifically technical problem solving,
more highly than strategic planning, modernization planning or even needs
analysis. One easily forms a vision captured in the caricature of a software
development group in which the group manager intones, "You all start coding
and I'll go upstairs and see what the customer wants"
Summary
The FAA has a diverse and complicated set of responsibilities and requires the
talents of skilled people of various sorts. The tasks of safely operating the busy
national airspace, certifying and regulating equipment and personnel that
operate in the system and continuously modernizing and improving the system
are daunting tasks that require the services of personnel with very different
functional orientation. The agency has organized along functional lines in an
effort to manage the activities of this diverse community. The combination of
organizational arrangement and personnel bias represented by culture and
background tend to reinforce the divisions between groups in the organization.
Formal processes recently instituted to improved system development
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performance, including the 1810.1F Acquisition Policy and the CIP Planning
Process, are intended to force the development process to flow through the
system. This approach is only partially successful because it is primarily
authoritarian in nature; it works only to the extent that the policies are rigidly
enforced. The processes are not rigorously enforced. The FAA needs to find a
better way to manage new system developments.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
PROCESSES IN SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AT FAA
Chapter 3 described both the organizational arrangement of the key offices of
the FAA relating to ATM system modernization and the major formal policies
and procedures prescribed for major system planning and development. This
chapter presents an analysis of the functionality of the agency's organizational
arrangement that was described in Chapter 3. An expansion and discussion of
processes used in system definition and development are covered in this
chapter.
This chapter makes several points:
- The combination of organizational boundary and difference in cultural
orientation make communication across functional divisions very difficult.
- There is no ethic for cross-functional teamwork at the FAA.
- Cross-functional teamwork is essential to successful implementation of most
development tasks.
- The allocation of resources and influence is unbalanced in regard to new
development activities, but the organizations with the most influence have
the least commitment to specific development goals.
- The formal acquisition policy does not adequately emphasize crucial needs
analysis that should occur early in the life of a potential project.
- The FAA leads the world in most development activities. ICAO represents
the interests of the worldwide aviation community whose priorities can differ
from the FAA's. The FAA serves the nation well by also accommodating the
needs of the international community.
FAA Organizational Orientation
The Federal Aviation Administration is organized along very strong functional
lines. The main constituents of the agency are the directorates of System
Operations and System Development (refer to Figure 1). The organizational
arrangement of these major divisions and some of the key offices within them
were described in Chapter 2.
Systems Operations and the FAA's Dual Mission
The FAA has a dual mission: the continuous augmentation of aviation safety,
and the promotion of civil aviation. There is no need for these two mission
features to ever be in conflict, for certainly if aviation is not perceived as safe it
will be impossible to promote it. At the same time, there are activities that might
be contemplated which could promote aviation and which could be, either in
fact or perception, damaging to safety which would not be countenanced by the
public, or by the agency. Thus we can conclude that, of the two sub-missions
assigned to the FAA, the enhancement of safety is the more imperative.
The Systems Operations directorate operates the air traffic management system
(Air Traffic), develops and administers rules, regulations and standards
governing aircraft, airmen and aeronautical operations (Regulations &
Certification, and Aviation Standards) and installs and maintains the federal
aviation infrastructure (Airway Facilities)1. Two of these groups, Air Traffic and
Regulations & Certifications (more particularly Flight Standards Service) are
key players in development of GPS/GNSS for civil aviation use as we saw in
Chapter 3. They are also responsible for the safety of the flying public.
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1 FAA Annual Report, p. 3.
Whenever there is a potential conflict between development and safety, the
issue must be decided on the side of safety.
Safety is like a mantra everywhere within the FAA (as it should be) and within
Systems Operations it takes on the character of the holy grail. After all, people
in this organization are directly and most immediately responsible for ensuring
public safety in regard to aviation. Certainly any new system development that
improves safety may be considered urgent. On the other hand, every no
product or procedure involves an element of uncertainty which can be
interpreted as compromising safety. In other words, unless a new development
is positively proven to improve safety, there is a tendency to consider it
potentially damaging to safety. The national airspace system has been
developed to guarantee safety. Commercial air transport in the US is by far the
safest mode of mechanized transport devised by man. Any change that could
remotely endanger that enviable record is subject to intense scrutiny and
potential opposition -- particularly from the people charged with the most direct
responsibility for system safety.
System operators, then, are most directly responsible for system safety since
they are responsible for operating the system everyday. They define the
certification standards for aircraft, and airmen, for air traffic controllers and air
traffic control procedures and for all airway facilities. These people depend on
carefully crafted procedures that are so thoroughly coordinated and tested they
can legitimately be called "certified." System operators have a common
characteristic of depending upon rules, rule books and procedures to
accomplish their jobs. They are the masters of rule-making and change the
63
rules only after the most careful consideration. These people make the "fully
certified" system work.
Systems Development and the FAA's Dual Mission
The System Development division also contributes essential services to the
promotion of safe aviation in the US. This group provides system engineering
and research and development services to prepare for the future, to safely
expand the capacity of the system, and to exploit emerging technology to
improve system safety.
System developers are a different breed than system operators. They seek
improvements in system capacity, reductions in cost and the application of
advanced technology for the variety of other benefits it can bring -- in addition
to searching out possible advances in system safety. As key players in the FAA
mission they are also bear some responsible for system safety as well as for
"promoting US aviation." Many of their developments are primarily intended to
improve airspace system safety. Certainly the vast majority of the Capital
Investment Plan projects make reference to improved safety as fundamental
justification -- and in most cases the claims are legitimate even when safety is
not the primary objective of the project.
These people by their nature, and due to the obligations of their jobs, are
experimenters. They explore new technology, conceive of new applications of
the technology, experiment with alternate designs to evaluate relative strengths
and weaknesses and create new hardware or software approaches to satisfy
users' needs. These people turn the unknown into the "fully certifiable."
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Organizational "Stovepipes" and Cultural Differences
The FAA has been reorganized several times since its establishment in 1958 as
the successor to the Civil Aviation Agency. According to one long-time FAA
manager, the FAA has been restructured 11 times since 1960 in efforts to focus
on key issues and make the agency more responsive to particular needs. The
strong functional orientation, however, has persisted throughout these
rearrangements. It is reasonable to speculate that the strong functional
orientation is a result of the significantly different tasks that must be performed to
accomplish the agency's diverse responsibilities. One could speculate that the
organizational boundaries were originally drawn expressly in an effort to
provide focus and assign responsibility for these major tasks. An unintended
effect of this division of responsibility is to differentiate and separate people with
various skills and with various intellectual orientations. This sort of separation
results in a strong senses of group identity that can be less than ideal for
operation or improvement of the ATM system.
Chapter 3 discussed the organizational arrangement and group responsibilities
of the main players in GPS/GNSS system development activities. This chapter
includes a discussion of the cultural attributes of each of the participating
groups. The implications of the compounded effects of functional and cultural
orientation is also included. We start with the two System Operations groups,
Air Traffic and Flight Standards and proceed to the Systems Development
groups, Systems Engineering, R&D Service and NAS Development:
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Air Traffic (AAT)
The Air Traffic Service, perhaps not surprisingly, is made almost entirely of air
traffic controllers. There is a strong social norm within the service to promote
worthy workers, and to promote from within the service. As one manager said
"there is a strong cultural norm at work: everyone needs to be promoted." So
the managers and executives within this arm of the agency are former
controllers. On the one hand, it may be necessary that competent managers in
this area have experience as controllers, but other background and experience
is also probably necessary to be good managers. Controllers often do not have
the educational background that might be expected for, and which would be
advisable for, management positions in the area.
Managers in this group have a reputation for being particularly insular and
inward looking. They are experts in the historical ways of air traffic control
procedures since they usually are among the best controllers in the crowd
which currently numbers more than 17,000. As a generality it might be said that
managers in Air Traffic are comfortable with the procedures with which they
worked as active controllers and are much more hesitant than developers to
experiment. One FAA manager said "they insist upon holding onto their security
blankets - and are not comfortable with any of the candidate changes that
might be desirable in the agency." At the same time they are desirous of
improvements in their system that will provide "more reliable hardware, better
software tools to help them control traffic, better weather information and
forecasting, better communications, clearer, more flexible displays and a better
working environment." But as a senior executive in the division said, -
"unfortunately, controller-defined improvements often do not improve the
airlines' capabilities or productivity. This is not serving the customer!" One
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comes away with a strong feeling that the controllers, or more accurately, the Air
Traffic Service as defined by its management, seek incremental improvements
in the way they accomplish well-established procedures. They may be eager to
adopt advanced technology solutions that are offered to reworking their
procedural tasks, but their orientation is toward the procedural status quo.
Indeed, managers in the Air Traffic Service have been vilified for their inability to
commit to a given system (hardware or software rather then procedural)
requirement. One manager closely associated with the group described Air
Traffic people as wanting "maximum flexibility in their system definition
activities; they can not be held to a fixed, or even stable, requirement."
We are left with an impression of the Air Traffic group at Headquarters as very
conservative, dependent upon existing procedures and hesitant to change
them, strictly oriented toward its functional hierarchy for rewards, fiercely loyal to
that same functional hierarchy, and undisciplined and unimaginative in its
approach to new system requirements. The combination of functional
orientation and particular culture in this group makes it difficult for personnel to
focus on the large objectives of system improvement and to work with other
more distant groups in Systems Development to accomplish these objectives.
Flight Standards (AFS)
The Flight Standards group is a component of the Administration for Regulation
& Certification, another arm of the System Operations directorate. This group, in
addition to having very different functional responsibilities from Air Traffic,
seems to have a decidedly different character in regard to innovation of the
National Airspace System. Flight Standards is responsible for the
communication navigation and landing equipment used in the national
67
airspace. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this equipment is sometimes confused
with "equipment in the airplane," but is more aptly conceived as equipment
required for the aircraft and flight crew to operate safely within the National
Airspace System. Flight Standards is also a very functionally oriented group.
The scope of the activity appropriate to the group is tightly bound; these people
operate strictly within the domain of definition and certification of equipment
necessary to operate the airplane.
This group is responsible for representing the interests of the users (i.e. airlines
and general aviation) in regard to communication, navigation and landing
systems. Flight Standards is the sponsor for mission needs in these areas; they
must form the foundation for everything that comes after in the FAA's acquisition
process.
Personnel from this group possess much more varied backgrounds than those
from Air Traffic. They often spend their entire careers with the FAA, but many
have worked in industry, including the airlines, avionics manufacturers, other
semi-government agencies such as RTCA, ARINC and the Dept. of Defense. A
more varied staff might help make for a more flexible and adaptable
organization. Bailyn suggests that it is not clear that there is an identifiable
organizational advantage to diversity; it might provide greater creativity and
innovation, but implementation and action are probably made more difficult. By
the same token, when an organization is inherently diverse, as is the FAA,
attempting to homogenize the organization can have negative repercussions2.
Learning from diversity can help produce organizational learning yielding a
more innovative, creative and flexible organization.
2 L. Bailyn, Personal Communication, Oct, 1993.
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Their contact with advanced technology and the cycle of new system
development in this arena is also more rapid than in Air Traffic. The cycle time
on airborne aeronautical equipment, particularly avionics, is more rapid than for
most of the ground based infrastructure. Advanced technology transmitters and
receivers and in flight management computers are introduced on a cycle of only
a handful of years rather than the twenty years or more for ground-based
system. This rapid cycle time makes the Flight Standards group more
responsive to the possibilities of advanced technology and more in tune with
the National Airspace System users.
The Flight Standards group, then, also has a strong functional bias, but since
the group is more diverse and the cycle time for new projects so rapid, the
group maintains a more experimental, open attitude than Air Traffic. The strong
functional orientation and the organizational boundaries tend to inhibit
communication across functional lines, but it this case the culture does not
compound the effect to stifle communication as in the case of Air Traffic.
Three key groups from the System Development (AXD) organization are
responsible for performing new development activities relating to GPS/GNSS.
Two of these are active in the current R&D phase: Systems Engineering
Service and the R&D Service. The third is the NAS Development organization.
Systems Engineering (ASE)
Systems Engineering is a relatively new group at FAA and has a key role to
play in the definition of the mission need statement and in all that occurs after
the initial preliminary MNS in the acquisition process. The main function of
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system engineering is to develop system level requirements from the definition
of an operational need or requirement. The initial task should be to consider
procedural and other technical solutions to satisfy the need, then to conduct
"trade studies" to determine the best compromise in satisfying the needs
according to specific performance and cost criteria. This is a crucial activity for
any complex new developmental situation and must also consider non-materiel
solutions, such as revised or new ATC procedures to be robust. This function is
sensibly a part of System Development since it is entirely a new system concept
analysis function and has no operational aspect to it. At the same time,
competent accomplishment of the system engineering discipline can only be
accomplished by very close cooperation between this group and the Mission
Needs Statement (MNS) sponsor. In the case of GPS/GNSS, the Mission
Needs Statement is Flight Standards. System Engineering is also responsible
for coordinating diverse development projects.
When I asked a manager in the Systems Engineering group to identify the
"owner" of the GPS MNS , I was told that prior to Key Decision Point #1 (KDP-1)
the Operations Research Service (AOR), a close companion organization in
Systems Development, had responsibility for the MNS. After that decision point,
responsibility transitioned to Systems Engineering. In other words, the
understanding is that AOR bears responsibility for defining the need and
developing the initial Mission Need Statement. Operations is presumably also
responsible for pushing the need through the initial gate, KDP-1, to authorize an
exploratory project.
After a project is authorized at KDP-1, Systems Engineering takes on more
responsiblity and shepherds the project through the rest of the process. A key
manager in the group told me that "Systems Engineering operates more like a
program management agency than like a system engineering outfit." But if this
is so, who works with the sponsoring organization (Flight Standards) to do the
early trade studies that are so critical to determining the path of a project? Who
helps decide if an ATC procedural solution is acceptable rather than some other
approach? Who conducts the detailed trade studies that are crucial to the Key
Decision Point #1 milestone? Something is being left out.
The System Engineering group apparently feels a clear responsibility for any
given project after KDP-1, that is, after the point at which a conceptual need is
clearly authorized as a developmental project. The group is ready and willing
to work diligently trying to satisfy a stated mission need. But ASE does not
speak for the user -- nor even the internal FAA user, i.e. the sponsor. They are
ready to proceed only with the engineering implementation of an approach that
has been authorized at KDP-1. At this point, there is also a clear intuitive chain
of responsibility to the Associate Administrator for System Development and
Engineering and thence to the Executive Director for System Development. But
the Acquisition Policy Order 1810.1 F does not describe responsibilities this
way. It clearly states that a mission needs analysis shall be performed at the
behest of an FAA user organization that sponsors the Mission Need Statement.
It further states that within a specified time of KDP-1, a single program manager
be designated to organize and direct the program and that he in turn develop a
program management team and program directive(s) to coordinate the activity
with other organizations. Program managers are typically selected from the
R&D Service for R&D projects not from System Engineering. Program
managers for CIP projects are from the NAS Development Administration. So
who is doing the trade studies? One high level executive who is close to the
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FAA described the acquisition process as practiced at FAA as "bogus". He went
on to say that the FAA does not have the proper social structure to enable or
accomplish complex system development. Perhaps nobody does the required
trade studies. More often, it is left to the program manager to acquire the skills
to conduct these trade studies form whatever cranny he can discover. At best,
we can conclude that they are poorly coordinated and roles and responsibilities
are not well understood.
Systems Engineering, then, is oriented toward coordinating development
projects. They have major responsibilities in determining CIP priorities and
analyzing mission needs, but the group is compromised between the need to
perform trade studies for requirements determination and the need to
coordinate projects already underway. Its culture is the most open of any of the
groups but the accountability is to System Development rather than Operations.
Systems Engineering represents the user's need only by proxy; the
organizational barriers tend to make this relationship problematic. Much of the
work of this group requires the contributions of many other functional players
but the work flows are sequential rather than concurrent because of
organizational barriers and cultural biases, particularly among other groups.
R&D Service (ARD)
The fourth is the R&D Service (ARD). It is the hard-core technology
development arm of the System Engineering & Development section.
Personnel in this group are mostly engineers and scientists. They posses both
the education and inclination to pursue advanced technology solutions to what
they perceive as various mission needs. In fact, when a program manager is
assigned from ARD it is fair to infer that an advanced system development
approach has been selected. There is a very strong functional orientation
72
1011110i I, 1 , 11 'U11W IN11101 161
within this group and a responsiveness to the Associate Administrator for
System Engineering & Development. Most of the people in this group have no
counterpart elsewhere in the agency, with the exception of the FAA Technical
Center (FAATC). Much of this group are now located at a leased building
several blocks from FAA Headquarters, which is where most of the other
organizations are located. R&D personnel have a strong technology orientation
and are removed both physically and organizationally from the real users and
the internal FAA users.
In summary we can say that the R&D Service is a rigorous, traditional
technology development outfit. It is also segregated from the rest of the agency,
physically because it is in a difference location, intellectually because it has no
counterparts or companions elsewhere in the agency and organizationally
because is has no organizational connections with other groups outside ASD.
Managers from a group with such liabilities would need to work particularly
diligently to integrate their contributions into the rest of the agency.
NAS Development (AND)
The fifth group to consider is the Administration for NAS Development (AND). It
is the major organization that typically handles the acquisition of CIP
development projects. It has no responsibility for R&D projects, such as most of
the current GPS/GNSS projects. Surprisingly, despite the fact that there are
now approved GPS/GNSS projects in the Capital Investment Plan,
responsibility for GPS/GNSS has not shifted from ASD to AND. But it is not
apparent that shifting responsibility to this organization would necessarily have
a beneficial effect. NAS Development manages the several projects discussed
in Chapter 1 that are over-spent and behind schedule. It appears that in spite of
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the greater major system acquisition experience that AND possesses compared
to any other group within the agency, there are still many opportunities for
learning in this complex arena. A senior manager within AND characterized the
organization as more matrix-oriented than ASD with a trend toward work-teams
and integrated development activity. He also described how AND essentially
inherits most of its work from ASD, and he stated that team work practices are
not yet developed at ASD. They are also not yet well developed within AND the
manager opined that there needs to be a much more integrative approach to
system development. He amplified by saying that the FAA bureaucracy is very
functionally oriented and is a remnant from another era. The moves toward
integrated product development are positive in this view but are too slow and
have not yet been adopted by all the necessary players. He says the SEOAT,
for example, needs more of a system engineering orientation. While one might
have thought the SEOAT's main task was system engineering, the suggestion is
that it makes CIP project decisions on criteria other than the FAA planning
guidance and hard trade studies of performance and cost for various system
alternatives.
While that manager seemed to have a clear view of what needed to change
within NAS Development, he was also clear that the changes have not yet
occurred and that the organization was highly oriented along functional lines.
We further see that the two major organizations in System Development both
take major responsibility for system development after a project reaches the
authorization stage (i.e. Key Decision Point #1); NAS Development works the
CIP projects, Systems Engineering and Development works R&D projects.
Before authorization, however, no one has clear responsibility to take charge of
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a mission need. The transition from the sponsor to one of the development
groups is confused and incomplete.
Summary of Function and Culture Impacts of Development Performance
Strong functional orientation and distinct group culture serve to isolate groups
from one another. Responsibility and accountability among line personnel is
clearly directed along the organizational, function chain. Potent cultural
differences is some organizations, such as in Air Traffic and R&D, serve to
inhibit communication. One group sees another as unfriendly since "they're not
like us." These two forces combine to produce powerful constraints on
individuals' ability or proclivity to actively communicate across organizational
boundaries. Cross-functional communication is necessary to effective
development.
Complex ATM Functional Interactions
The foregoing analysis points out the disconnects that are apparent in the most
basic and straightforward of the acquisition projects. The strong functional
orientation, different and perhaps incompatible culture exhibited by the two
major divisions with the agency, and the poorly understood, imperfectly
practiced acquisition policy all serve to make the sharing of responsibility
impaired as a project moves through the process. The discussion so far has
been relevant to projects that are conceived as all within the domain of a single
function, as for example the case of the Microwave Landing System which is
limited in its functional applications to landing guidance and would be
presumed to be entirely within the domain of the Flight Standards functional
responsibilities. The tortuous history of this project points out the procurement
difficulties that can be encountered. What is likely to happen to projects whose
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aims cross functional boundaries, even at the outset? There are several
examples of goals, or operational needs, that are addressed by GPS/GNSS
and which cross the functional boundaries at the FAA sponsor level. A brief
discussion centers on the synergistic simultaneous benefits enabled by
GPS/GNSS but which were not recognized because of insufficient cross
functional communication between agency sponsors with one another and with
Development personnel. The needs that GPS/GNSS addresses for three of
these, Automatic Dependent Surveillance and Direct Flight Plan Routing and
Precision Approach Capability are discussed in the following sections:
Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
ADS is a process through which controllers are able to determine precisely the
location of aircraft in the airspace based on data available in the aircraft alone.
The process is based on the idea that surveillance can be accomplished by the
controllers if they are able to acquire the precise data that is already available in
the aircraft (i.e. position, altitude, velocity, direction, turn rate, etc.) thereby
obviating the need for an independent surveillance system (i.e. ground-based
radar). The data can be datalinked to ATC facilities either through line-of-sight
VHF datalinks or through satellite communication links. The surveillance is
automatic because the aircraft transmits its navigation data to the air traffic
control system without intervention of either the flight crew or any controllers. It
is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the aircraft navigation and
flight management systems and upon the existence of a suitable datalink.
There are many potential benefits to world-wide ADS, including the ability to
monitor aircraft location over oceanic and desolate areas thereby reducing
oceanic separation standards and increasing airspace capacity, the potential to
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eliminate the extensive ground-based, maintenance intensive ATC enroute-
radar network, and the potential to develop collision avoidance systems for all
aircraft based on ADS.
ADS crosses the functional boundaries between several System Operations
groups. The surveillance function is a prime responsibility of Air Traffic but the
navigation source of the data is the domain of Flight Standards. These two
groups have adopted the concept of ADS an objective for the ATM system, but
until recently the main objective has been to reduce reliance on ground-based
radar systems.
The approach has centered on the need to develop a communications datalink
to transmit airplane-determined position to the controllers. The additional
benefit of potential airspace capacity increases enabled by more accurate
position, velocity and time information which is possible with GPS/GNSS has
only lately been recognized. This is a case in which people in the R&D Service
has long recognized the potential of GPS/GNSS to provide more accurate data
and where that knowledge was not effectively communicated to the potential
sponsors in a way that could stimulate the sponsors to demand the capability.
For a long period, the statement of ADS need has presumed only the
availability of current generation navigation sources such as VOR/DME and
inertial navigation systems. Thus, while the sponsors had cooperated to state a
need for ADS capability, they demanded only part of the utility that could be
available thanks to the new satellite technology. While this additional utility is
now recognized and planned for, the restrictions on cross-functional
communication in the agency help explain why it was recognized so late.
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The salient problem here is that the system evaluation and improvement
process does not even commence, let alone progress, without a clear and
vigorous sponsor from within the FAA. Many examples are mentioned in
Chapter 2 of NAS system needs that are not effectively satisfied partly because
there is no operational sponsor that stands up, clearly defines the need,
evaluates potential solutions, monitors development against some agreed
statement of work, and pays the bills. These are basically the dynamics of the
successful enterprise in which customers contract for goods and services. This
dynamic is completely missing within the FAA for even the most dedicated
projects in which the customer is eager and clearly identified. In the case of
ADS, the sponsors only demanded part of the feasible capability because they
did not understand the technology nor did they understand who was
responsible for demanding it.
Direct Routing/Optimal Trajectory Flight Planning
Direct routing shares many of the characteristic of ADS. The desire for direct
routing is to traverse more efficient, economical and rapid flight paths. It frees
airspace users from the constraints of ground-based navigation systems for
flight path planning. Most current flight paths are coincident with the airway
system defined by the existing VOR network. The airways reduce to some
extent the controllers need for precise position data by concentrating aircraft in
relatively small proportion of the airspace (in other words, the controller does
not have to inspect all segments of the airspace if he knows where the traffic is
at the outset). This approach obviously has the adverse consequence of
jamming the users together and unnecessarily limits airspace capacity and the
users' ability to operate the airplane most efficiently.
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Direct routing capability would provide the ability to navigate with sufficient
accuracy to ensure precise flight tracking according to an arbitrary flight plan
filed before departure. This approach allows trips to navigate direct from origin
to destination and at optimal altitudes. It is dependent upon precise 4-D
navigation capability everywhere in the airspace as well and on air traffic
control's ability to monitor aircraft navigation performance, or conformance to
plan. The capability will probably also depend upon a significant amount of
automation to process the numerous, potentially conflicting, flight paths. The
benefits of direct routing would begin when a large percentage of the civil fleet
has developed this capability. This requires foresight, and a long term
commitment to ubiquitous adoption of such on-board capability.
Much like ADS, direct routing implies the sponsorship of more than one
Operations group. The history of sponsorship on this need, however, is one of
no sponsor, rather than joint sponsorship. There are serious demands to be
placed on communications, navigation and automation resources for such a
capability. Controllers would also very likely need to adopt new procedures to
accommodate the diversity of flight paths that would be present. But there is no
doubt that the airspace users need this capability. Cross functional sponsorship
along with the contribution of the R&D service is required to effectively even
state this need, let alone develop the capability.
Precision Approach Capability
Precision approach capability is the ability to provide lateral and vertical flight
path guidance to near the touchdown zone of a runway that approximates the
capability of an Instrument Landing System. Formally, the FAA planning
documents cite the Microwave Landing System as the means to this capability.
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The agency has had plans to implement MLS for more than a decade, but these
plans are now obsolete. GPS has already been certified for non-precision
approaches to thousands of airports and with wide area differential
enhancements GPS is expected to provide precision approach guidance to
thousands of runways around the world by 1996. When the wide area
differential enhanced GPS is certified, other precision approach aids, such as
Category I MLS will be unnecessary. Further enhancements are likely to make
higher precision aids unnecessary.
The case of Precision Approach Guidance is clearly a case of the technology
getting ahead of the FAA system development process. The tardiness in
creating a GPS Mission Needs Statement (which was not created until summer
of 1992 -- only 18 months before initial operational capability) occurred
because R&D, which held the expertise and interest in GPS, and Flight
Standards, which is responsible for navigation and landing needs, were not
communicating
The facts are that ADS, Direct Routing and Precision Approach Capability are
now implicit needs in the GPS MNS although none is emphatic. 3 GPS has
been in development for more than fifteen years; its initial operational capability
was originally anticipated before 1990 and was actually achieved in December,
1993. The ICAO identified the need for satellite-based ADS in the late 1980s
and the entire body confirmed the need in September, 1991. The FAA only
accomplished a GPS mission need statement in June, 1992.
3 NAS Program Initiative #0050, p. 5.
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I contend that the main reasons for the agency's apparent tardiness in initiating
a serious GPS/GNSS program was the lack of operational sponsorship within
the FAA. Recognition of the need was under-emphasized for a combination of
reasons:
- In many functional respects, GPS/GNSS was perceived by Operations
people as duplicating navigation systems already in place within the
National Airspace System (if not generally in the world). System Operations
people are generally hesitant to change the status quo as we have seen.
- Many of the needs that GPS/GNSS can satisfy cut across functional
boundaries within Operations, as in the cases of ADS and direct routing
discussed above, so there was no sponsor for change within an FAA user
organization.
- Communication between Operations and Development groups was
incomplete so Operations people did not appreciate, until recently, the
added benefits of GPS.
- GPS is a DOD system, so the presumption may have been that FAA only
need to monitor its continuing development at the hands of the other agency.
The particular needs of civil aviation users for assured availability, reliability
monitoring and improved accuracy were not recognized as crucial to
operational improvements.
Implications of Cross-Functional Communication
In the early 1990s, the rest of the world was gearing up to take advantage of the
services offered by GPS. In the US, National Airspace System users began to
shout for an upgrade of GPS to full GNSS capability -- and more. Flight
Standards reacted and sponsored a MNS and today stands as the principal
sponsor of GPS/GNSS capability. Air Traffic is still apparently out of the loop.
The R&D Service, technology proponents to the core, are still the main drivers
of the GPS/GNSS capability. The process works best, though, when a user is
the main impetus behind a project. GPS, perhaps like many ATM improvement
projects, cuts across traditional functional boundaries. But needs which should
have several sponsors thereby obtaining increased sponsorship and vigor, end
up with no clear sponsor resulting in more diffused and ineffectual support. This
is a clear problem for management at FAA.
Resource Allocations
The application of resources is a powerful indicator of influence in an
organization. Examination of the use of human and financial resources reveals
that Operations is by far the most influential of the two major division at the FAA.
The following sections will consider both dollar and human resources.
Funds
Major categories of spending for the FAA over the last 13 years are shown in
Figure 4. The categories of spending are Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
which is directed toward improvements in runway, taxiway and terminal
improvements at public-use airports around the country; Facilities and
Equipment (F&E) which is almost entirely spending on CIP projects; Research
and Development (R&D) which is directed toward advanced technology
investigations that could provide potential solutions in the future to National
Airspace System needs; and Operations and Headquarters activities necessary
to perform the ongoing aviation safety regulation and general management of
the agency.
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Figure 4: Major Funding Categories in FAA Budget.
The figure depicts the large increase in F&E budgets which accompanied the
original NAS Plan. A significant retrenchment in National Airspace System F&E
activities in fiscal 1986 was later reversed and F&E activities have grown
dramatically as a fraction of agency budget. In recent years there has been a
greater reluctance on the part of DOT and the Administration to continue the
large increases in F&E spending despite continuing difficulties with CIP
implementation. That gravy train may have finally by running out, but at
magnitudes of over $2 billion a year could not be considered small.
It is also worth noting that the PATCO strike in 1981 which resulted in massive
firings of the controller workforce, had a smaller impact on Operations budgets
than might be suspected. In fiscal 1983 Operations and HO budgets were up
only 17% compared to the year before. By comparison, during the interval
between fiscal 1985 and 1992 the F&E budget increased 5.2 times, or 420%!
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In fiscal 1994, Operations and Headquarters activities are expected to consume
$4.58 billion out of an agency budget of $9.19 billion, or 50%. At $254 million
and $2.12 billion the R&D and F&E budgets represent 3% and 23% respectively
of the total agency budget.
It should be noted that both F&E and R&D funds described in these data are
generally for contracted goods and services, rather than agency personnel. But
the distinction is not perfectly clear since both F&E and R&D accounts are used
to procure contract services to support in-house activities related to various
acquisition projects. Thus some of the F&E and R&D funds identified in the
figure above are used to provide surrogate FAA personnel.
Personnel
The permanent FAA human resource allotments are depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Major Employment Categories at FAA
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There is no mystery in these data. The FAA staff is ruled by Operations. In
1984, 94% of the permanent allocated positions are in Operations and
Headquarters areas. Out of slightly more than 54,000 positions in the agency,
R&D areas are allocated 645 (1.2%) and F&E dedicated areas 2504 (4.6%)
people. The effect of the PATCO strike is much more apparent in these data
than the funding data. As mentioned above, there are other people hired on
contract to support F&E and R&D activities, so the numbers reflected here in
those areas are perhaps not as severe as they appear.
The background and culture of the FAA are clearly evident in these data: The
permanent employment at the agency is directed toward ongoing operations;
the role of system development as evidenced by F&E budgets in particular and
to a lesser extent by R&D budgets did not exist as a major activity at the agency
before fiscal 1983. The large increase in F&E spending and the realignment
and expansion of agency responsibilities occurred as a result of the grand NAS
plan.
Recognizing these facts, it is perhaps not surprising that:
- System Operations is not geared toward taking responsibility for sponsoring
and defining new system needs.
- there was not a formal acquisition policy in place at the agency until very
recently and that the policy is still not well understood or widely practiced
today.
- there is not a strong sense of teamwork, communal purpose and
cooperation between the major divisions in the agency.
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Roles, Responsibilities and Rewards
The first sections of this chapter described the functional and cultural orientation
of the key players relating to GPS/GNSS. This section reviews key aspects of
the interactions between these players and highlights some of the difficulties
encountered in modernization activities.
Understanding Functional Roles
There were several occasions in the interviews when I received contradictory or
conflicting data about who was responsible for what during the mission needs
analysis and the rest of the acquisition process. In most cases, these
conversations were with senior managers. One wonders what confusion would
have been evidenced if the regular workers had been queried for a description
of the process. I was frequently greeted with the comment that when I had
figured it out, would I please let the respective managers know how the system
was supposed to operate. While this sort of remark is frequently encountered in
large organizations working complex tasks, it was startling to find so frequently
among senior managers. Interestingly, the people who seemed most confident
of their comprehension of the system were those who had been in their jobs
only a relatively short time. It was apparent to me that they had studied the
formal procedures and had paid attention to the process briefings they had
received as a normal part of taking a new assignment. They were not yet
confused by the way things really worked around the agency!
Understanding functional roles of the various groups both in Operations, and
Development is clearly deficient at the FAA. This situation arises from practices
of senior management. There is good reason to suspect that the strong
functional orientation of the agency is hurtful to its work since people do not look
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"sideways" to the other functions, but concentrate on the "vertical" aspects of
their chain of command. It is very difficult for them to get coordinated with this
frame of mind and many issues must be elevated to high levels that should be
decided at the working level. What's more, that one group does not clearly
understand the commitment of another group in this environment is a
prescription for disaster; everyone can easily assume that someone else is
taking care of the problem when, in fact, no one is paying attention.
Ownership of the Need
The key to the acquisition process as defined in FAA Order 1810.1F is the
development of a Mission Need Statement at the behest of an FAA sponsor.
The sponsor is expected to work in the interests of one of the National Airspace
System users. The entire approach to system development depends upon a
sponsor who has a definite need, is committed to communicating that need and
struggles to obtain the resources to satisfy the need. Once those resources are
available it is the sponsor who should maintain some leverage over the quality
of the solution to be implemented. The sponsor of a project can not be a bit
player in this process or be relegated to observer status once it is initiated.
FAA management must strengthen the commitment of the various Operations
groups to their responsibility to sponsor system modernization. This
commitment should consider procedural as well as new system approaches. It
should be clearly understood by everyone involved in the development process
that the Operations groups are the sponsors of the projects and that they work in
behalf of National Airspace System users. Project sponsors should appreciate
the influence they have over development priorities and they responsibilities
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they hold to an effective development process. They must be disciplined and
committed to system modernization developments and a rigorous development
process. This is the message defined in 1810.1 F, but it must be reinforced and
clarified to the entire agency.
Cross-Functional Team Activities
FAA management must work to reduce the functional orientation of the staffs if it
has any intention of continuing to perform system development activities -- as
surely it must to maintain an efficient, safe and productive airspace system.
Concentration should be placed on improving teamwork and cooperation
between staffs. This weakness is recognized by many at the FAA and the
recommendation presented here was made by many of those managers; it is
not universally held, however, and some at the agency would see their
influence and territorial control diminished. The latter applies particularly to
managers in the Air Traffic.
There are indications that purposeful team activities are being initiated at the
agency in light of the recognition to promote teamwork. In February, 1994 the
Executive Directors of System Operations and of System Development initiated
two experimental development projects to be performed with integrated product
development teams. The teams will be comprised of fully dedicated people
from relevant groups in each of the divisions with a single team leader that will
report to both Executive Directors. Each individual team member will maintain
his functional duties, but will contribute them in a full-time team setting rather
than as a task worker separated by functional walls. The first of the projects is
expected to commence in March, 1994.
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However, one issue that is yet to be resolved is the personnel evaluation and
appraisal process that will apply in integrated product team settings. It is
necessary that workers be responsible to the team for the quality of their work,
but the human resource process at FAA is firmly entrenched along functional
lines. The reward system is one of the most effective ways of communicating
overall organizational objectives. If the rewards continue to be distributed by
functional management, the transition to a product orientation will be upset,
incomplete or nonexistent. On the other hand, if rewards are determined by
solely project management, functional competence can perhaps suffer. Some
combination of evaluation factors is probably best, but the dominance of
functional management in this process should be revised. These procedures
must be changed to give the program manager, as the agent of the sponsor,
more control over appropriate rewards to development team members.
Requirements Definition
The acquisition policies recently authorized at the FAA attempt to impose a
systematic and rigorous process on new development activities. The following
analysis of these policies point out:
- significant confusion in particular process definitions including operational
need, operational requirement and system concept.
- an omission, or under-emphasis, in the acquisition policies to conduct
mission needs analysis to properly consider non-materiel procedural
solutions.
- the potential for simulation as an integral part of the early needs analysis
process.
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Mission Needs or Operational Requirements?
The FAA Acquisition Policy, Order 1810.1F, requires that an operational
requirements document (ORD) be published during Phase 1, Concept
Exploration and Alternatives Analysis, of a new program. The ORD
"establishes system-level performance thresholds and objectives and defines
the planned life cycle of the product. It shall be updated during subsequent
acquisition phases to reflect the results of trade-off studies, engineering
development, and testing.. .A performance threshold is the value for a
performance parameter that is necessary to satisfy mission need. An [sic]
performance objective is a parameter value beyond the threshold that could
potentially have a measurable and beneficial impact on capability. These
performance objectives and threshold vales shall be developed from and
remain consistent with the statement of operational need in the mission
need statement. The ORD is the bridge between operational and functional
requirements in the mission need statement and the performance
specification that will govern development of a product. It provides the basis
for performance thresholds and objectives in the acquisition program
baseline and for the initial test and evaluation master plan."4
The ORD, like the Mission Need Statement, is a critical contributor to any new
system acquisition process since it established the most basic requirements for
a new system. What is meant here by requirements and how are they different
than need? What is an operational requirement and how is it different from a
functional requirement? Operational concepts are not mentioned in the
paragraph above but are often mentioned is such discussion -- what are they?
How is a performance specification different than a technical specification?
These questions are not answered in the FAA Acquisition Policy, or in any other
FAA policy that I have been able to discover. The differences between these
terms is significant although many of them are used synonymously which often
confuses the development process.
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4 FAA Order 1810.1F, p 1-19.
There is another issue that warrants discussion, which is that the ORD
prescription defined above has an obvious predilection toward new system --
either hardware or software -- development. Non-materiel items, such as new
procedures development, while not explicitly prohibited, are also not particularly
encouraged during this phase. The supposition seems be that a
comprehensive and orderly approach to mission needs analysis, which is
accomplished in Phase 0, before KDP-1, is the stage at which non-materiel
solutions should be considered and that once into Phase 1 an ORD is required
only to manage "system-level performance.. .and the planned life cycle of the
product." This presumption is hazardous and will be examined in the following
section.
System Development Definitions
It is imperative that system developers, including the end-user and the sponsor
within the FAA as well as the engineering developers and contractors,
understand the requirements and specifications that are defined in any process
improvement activity. There is great latitude for misunderstanding in this area
unless the terms are clearly defined. Opposing views of the best approach to
be used in ATM system improvement exist and are certainly legitimate, but
many disagreements might well be the result of semantics due to imperfect
communication or misuse or poor understanding of common terminology. In
the absence of explicit definitions in FAA's acquisition literature, I offer the
definitions below to facilitate further discussion:
Functional Requirement -- a statement of the necessary capability to be
provided by the system in terms of separate functional aspects of a total task.
Functional Specification -- synonymous with functional requirement above.
Operational (or Operations) Concept -- a vision of a future approach to satisfy
an operational need, including procedures, hardware and software and
logistics support. There could be many operational concepts that would satisfy
a particular operational need to varying degrees and at different cost.
Operational Need -- a statement of the necessity to perform a high-level task
that can not currently be performed. Operational needs must be stated in
operational terms (i.e. in terms of the task that must be accomplished) rather
than in terms of specific procedures, hardware or software so that useful
alternatives analysis may be performed.
Operational Procedure -- a description of how equipment and information are
employed in order to accomplish a particular task. Operational procedures can
be very detailed, down to the individual operator level; in the aggregate they
define how the system is used to satisfy an operational need.
Operational Requirement -- a description of the roles to be performed by an
element in an operational concept. The needs for each element of the
operational concept, whether procedure, hardware or software, are defined in
operational terms at this level. Collectively, description of all elements in an
operational concept are the operational requirements and are gathered into the
ORD.
Performance Specification -- a specific criterion to be achieved by a new system
component. Applies to procedures, hardware and software. Performance
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specs may be defined at any level of system definition, from the smallest
identifiable system component up to the integrated system. Performance specs
must be appropriate to the level of aggregation and are selected to be relevant
to the particular function(s) to be accomplished by the component.
Technical Specification -- also referred to as design specs, is the detailed
physical description of a development item. Applies to hardware and software.
In the case of software, the spec. defines the structure of the software
component, interfaces and data flows. This spec. also often includes
manufacturing or production process definition.
These commodities flow into one another in a sensible pattern as development
progresses. Figure 6, which follows, shows the flow of the items described
above at a fairly global level. The acquisition policy defines the process in
considerably greater detail although it differs in important ways as will be
discussed below.
The FAA Acquisition Policy does not fully agree with the requirements
development process defined in Figure 6. This gap is important. In particular, it
leaves out the Operational Concept Analysis and Development activity
altogether. Initially, one jumps to the logical conclusion that it would be
included in the Phase 1 activity as part of Concept Exploration/Alternatives
Analysis, but the consideration of non-materiel solutions for all practical
purposes is left behind at Phase 0, Mission Needs Analysis. The "concept" that
is understood in the FAA's parlance is a new hardware/software solution. The
language in the description of the ORD quoted above is testimony to the fact
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that operation procedures, for example, are not normally considered as part of
the Concept Exploration phase.
Figure 6: Requirements Development Process
I propose here that an Operational Concept Analysis and Development phase
be inserted in the place of the Concept Exploration phase. At the very least, the
FAA policy should be rewritten to emphasize the operational aspects of the
development process rather then quickly focusing on new systems
developments as the current approach does.
Simpson describes the current "inverted" development process in which a set of
technical specifications are let to a contractor to produce a prototype system as
one of the first development activities. In this approach expected benefits can
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usually be vaguely stated in general terms of safety, cost reductions and
capacity, but there is often no attempt actually to examine the operational
problems. It is often at the point of prototype evaluation that the real needs of
the system become apparent, which may require extensive parallel
development in other areas or extensive redesign when a simple operational
solution could have solved the problem.5
Operational Requirements & Operational Procedures
It is imperative that FAA revise its approach to systems improvement processes
to take account of the proper consideration of procedural modifications early in
the needs analysis phase.
Even if the current policy statement does not preclude the approach described
in Figure 6, at also does nothing to either require the approach or even clarify its
desirability. This is a major failing and points out the lack of a disciplined
system engineering approach to ATM modernization. Certainly the advent of
Order 1810.1 F is helping to instill a measure of systematic discipline to
development processes, but the policy itself is flawed with its obvious
predilection for new system procurement as the expected outcome of every
operational need. This attitude is misguided and renewed emphasis must be
placed on consideration of operational procedures.
Nor are operational procedures in lieu of new systems the only issue. Even
when new hardware or software elements are required in the ATM system there
are certain to be procedural implications. If new procedures are not considered
from the outset, many of the gains that could be provided by new systems will
95
5 Simpson, June, 1993, p 4.
be squandered. In some cases potential benefits will not even have been
discovered without some creative consideration of alternative procedural
approaches.
One of the difficulties the FAA apparently encounters in considering procedural
innovation is the cultural orientation of the operators, i.e. air traffic controllers,
which is discussed earlier in this chapter. Standard operating procedures are
the bedrock of Air Traffic's approach to operating the ATM system. While there
may be many individual controllers who would eagerly consider procedural
innovation, from an institutional perspective modification of'certified procedures
is a high-risk proposition. There are many risks and the benefits can be both ill-
defined and uncertain. The culture among management at Air Traffic
recognizes very little reward for this sort of innovation. The agency needs a way
to lower the perceived and actual risk of procedural innovation.
Operational Simulation Capability
One approach to facilitating innovation of air traffic management procedures as
well as lowering the risk of the innovation is through simulation. Simulation for
air traffic control task has long been recognized as an essential tool to
understand the human factors aspects of control operations and controller
workstation design. In fact the Review Panel of the FAA RE&D Advisory
Committee recommended that simulation capability be given a high priority by
the agency to "streamline the transition of new technologies and concepts into
the nation's air traffic system."6
Partly as a result of the Panel's recommendation, the FAA now has two -
separate simulation facilities. The National Simulation Capability (NSC) which
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6 R&D Plan Review Panel, p 36.
is located at MITRE and the FAATC, and the National Airspace Management
Facility (NAMFAC) is at Oak Ridge, TN. The objective of both systems is to
provide simulation capability of air traffic control tasks. Beyond that the
distinction between these systems is unclear. On the one hand, it is
encouraging that FAA has taken the guidance to heart so emphatically. On the
other hand, the question is raised if the resources would be more effective if
they were concentrated in a single facility.
In any event, it will not be sufficient to use the simulation capability to examine
new technologies, new hardware and new software approaches. The
simulation capability should also be applied to new procedures development. It
should be an explicit goal of the simulation capability to develop new
procedures for ATM modernization independent of other system developments.
In other words, procedural innovations should be actively investigated in a
simulation facility with both the current infrastructure and with new systems
explorations. Such a task should be an essential element of the Operational
Concept Analysis & Development phase of every project.
Systems Thinking Approach
Since the publication of Forrester's book, Industrial Dynamics, in 1961, a field
has grown up that examines the performance of processes determined by
complex systems of interrelationships. The field is now generally referred to as
"System Dynamics" and focuses on problems that are characterized by dynamic
behavior and in which that behavior is determined by feedback in a process.
The dynamic nature of the performance means that it changes over time; the
notion of feedback implies that an "output" of a process will also be an "input" to
that same process.
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The virtue of systems dynamics analysis is that it provides a powerful and
unique way of modeling the complex features and interactions in virtually any
process. It allows an examination of the effects of some hypothetical policy shift
on the entire system, which is likely to be too complex to analyze by sequential
exposition or by intuition. Indeed, one of the main benefits of the systems
thinking approach is to reveal how inaccurate intuition can be in predicting
behavior to a change in system management policy. Many problems related to
ATM modernization, for example, are too complex to analyze intuitively; the
application of management actions in one area can have totally unforeseen
consequences in another are. Process that are determined by complex
interactions, as are ATM modernization processes, are ideal for systems
dynamics analysis.
A preliminary attempt at creating a definition of the key parameters,
relationships and influence structures for one important sub-process is included
in this thesis as Appendix D. The sub-process selected for this work is the
conduct of the Mission Needs Analysis discussed elsewhere. Several variables
determine the performance of that system including, number and skills of
system engineering and operations research personnel, level of commitment of
system engineering and FAA sponsor personnel, work load, and many others.
The definition in Appendix D is, perhaps, incomplete, but could provide a
nucleus to initiate future work.
Impact of ICAO on FAA
ICAO is the spokesman for the international civil aviation community. It is the
only organization that represents the diverse aviation interests of governments
and industry around the world. The FAA, which manages the largest, most
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complex and most capable civil aviation system in the world, is usually far in
advance of the rest of the world's aviation community. This situation produces a
tendency on the part of FAA management to discount or ignore the issues
raised at ICAO. Occasionally, though, ICAO stakes out a position that differs
substantially with the FAA position and which proves to be superior. FAA
management would do well to upgrade its interaction with ICAO.
As I initially planned this research, I assumed that the ICAO would be a powerful
force influencing the actions and activities of the FAA in its ATM modernization
endeavors. Similarly, I expected that the FAA, in turn, would have considerable
influence over the international agency. In other words, I expected that the two
organizations would be roughly equal partners in conceiving and developing
global air traffic management plans and processes. The research in this area
was directed at understanding where the centers of power lie for various issues,
including institutional issues such as ownership, control, and charging for
services of a global asset such as GPS/GNSS. Interviews with managers at
ICAO and FAA contradicted my expectations in several important areas which
are discussed below.
The general attitude among managers at FAA is that the agency leads ICAO.
Both technical developments and air traffic procedural matters are assumed to
be so far advanced compared to the rest of the world that little consideration is
normally given to developments outside the US. Several people at FAA
explicitly stated they felt ICAO would eventually adopt policies and plans
initiated at FAA and that interactions with ICAO were essentially political in
nature. In other words, FAA managers recognized that it would be necessary to
form political coalitions with other countries or other international players in
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order to smoothly promulgate FAA developed plans and procedures throughout
the rest of the world, but that, with the least bit of common sense, FAA's plans
were essentially de facto world standards. The hubris associated with the
dominance of the US in post-WW 11 civil aviation is extensive in the FAA.
Despite the fact that there are some recent cases (albeit few) of standards or
technology being instigated from outside the US, or by some agent other than
FAA, at ICAO there is also begrudging acknowledgment that FAA policy, once
firmly set, is essentially unassailable. An interesting historical example is the
case of Microwave Landing System (MLS) standards. The UK was the
strongest proponent of MLS initially because of their need for frequency
allocation that did not conflict with other aeronautical radio and commercial FM
broadcast uses, as well as for other reasons. The British were largely
responsible for promoting MLS as the preferred approach to future precision
landing-aid needs. But there was a significant difference of opinion about the
signal pattern that should be adopted as the international standard for MLS.
The US and UK each had a different preference. In the end MLS was adopted,
but with the US-recommended signal pattern.
This decision presumably was made on the basis of technical merit. It is
significant to observe that in this case the concept was initially promoted to the
international community from outside the US, but US interests determined the
outcome of establishing a technical standard. Perhaps this example is more
typical of the pattern for development of international standards and
recommended practices (SARPs).
Consider GPS/GNSS, as another example. While the US DOD had been
developing GPS since the 1970s, the FAA had no more than an observer role
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and as recently as 1990 (less than three years before initial operational
capability) asserted that GPS would neither be mature enough or certifiable for
civil navigation until after the turn of the century. The FANS committee, which
had been considering the use of space-based resources since the mid-1980s,
recommended a complement of satellite systems to support future ATM systems
in 1988. This position was adopted by the ICAO membership in 1991 as
described earlier. There can be little doubt that the commitment to satellite
navigation evidenced by the ICAO decision had some influence with the FAA to
increase its activities in development and promotion of GPS/GNSS. Finally, as
we have seen, in the FAA 1992 turned on the Satellite Navigation Program in a
serious way. Domestic users, particularly the airlines, were also influential in
stimulating the FAA to initiate the Satellite Navigation project. There can be
little doubt that the advanced position established by ICAO stimulated both the
airlines and the FAA to adopt the satellite approach. The details of the GNSS
implementation process remain to be determined, but it is clear that the FAA is
now moving rapidly to accomplish the objectives of the FANS
recommendations, and more, using enhanced GPS.
It seems probable, now that FAA is committed to GPS/GNSS, that they will
develop and adopt technical processes and procedures that accomplish the
FANS objectives. Indeed plans are well along to enhance GPS sufficiently to
do more than even the FANS concept allocates to GNSS -- for example to use
GPS/GNSS for non-precision approaches at virtually every suitable certified
airport in the world; with wide area differential capability, for precision
approaches with Category I capability to suitable runways; and with local area
differential, for precision approaches with Category IlIl capability to suitable
runways. Excepting the possibility of technical "show stoppers," which are not
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considered likely, it is virtually certain that these capabilities will be
implemented by the FAA. Plans for wide area differential capability commit to
full operational capability by 1998 but managers believe it will be available by
the end of 1996. No approved plans yet exist for local area differential, but it is
expected before the end of the decade. The US government has also offered
the world community free, unhindered access to GPS signals for a minimum of
ten years and into the foreseeable future (with a minimum of six years notice for
a change in this policy) Given these facts, there is little doubt that the enhanced
GPS will become the system ICAO envisioned for GNSS. In addition, the
enhanced GPS will have more capability than originally identified by the FANS
committee for a satellite navigation system.
FAA is proceeding along this development path satisfied that it is meeting
domestic user needs and assuming that the resulting system will also meet the
international community's needs as well. But there are some issues that
continue to be concerns to GNSS users around the world such as:
- who pays for maintenance and upgrades of the system after it meets the
basic needs?
- how will charges be imposed by the US on system users, if at all?
- how can the world community be assured that, in times of world crisis, the
US will not restrict or eliminate access to navigation signals for security
reasons?
These are legitimate concerns and loom larger in the consciousness of users
outside the US than those inside. It is conceivable that a commercial venture
providing assured access to satellite navigation would be viable if a robust and
reliable revenue collecting scheme were developed. Some people claim that a
dedicated civil navigation system could be fielded for less then half the cost of
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GPS that would have greater accuracy, and as much coverage and reliability
since it would not need the provisions dictated by national security. At $10
billion, GPS is not a good example of the costs of civil navigation satellite
development costs. (The economic analysis of this proposition is beyond the
scope of the current work.) Even if it is only a remote possibility, the prospect of
a commercial satellite navigation system energized by the issues enumerated
above could complicate and confuse a world standard approach to permanent
GNSS. The Joint DOD/DOT Task Force on GPS management and operation
also recognized the desirability of addressing these international concerns
early when it recommended to the Secretaries of the two departments that DOT
should initiate new activities to "enhance international acceptance of GPS."7
ICAO is the obvious body in which to debate and decide these issues and FAA
would serve the nation and the world by addressing these concerns early.
Senior management at the agency seems to be uncertain of the magnitude or
importance of these issues by the international community. They project the
attitude that once GPS is in place with the appropriate enhancements these
concerns will evaporate. While US officials can be smug in their confidence
that GPS services will always be available, they should appreciate that the rest
of the world is not convinced and that further negotiations culminating in
relevant policy commitments may be necessary to perpetuate a satisfactory
world standard for GNSS.
Summary
There are several lessons for FAA management in the analyses discussed in
this chapter. For one, executive management should recognize that the
7 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, p ES-4.
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background, experience and culture of different parts of its staff tend to
reinforce, rather than diminish, the divisions between groups. These forces
work to seriously inhibit communication and cooperation between groups,
which can be fatal to complicated development projects. Secondly, the agency
has no experience and thus no ethic for teamwork. The "feudal fiefdoms" that
one manager described captures the essence of the agency work ethic, which
is inimical to teamwork. Cross-functional sponsorship and team work is
essential to the crucial task of needs identification and analysis, but the agency
has no regular mechanisms to facilitate cross-functional interaction. Thus
critical activities are left unfinished or are never identified as necessary.
It is also evident that power and influence are unevenly distributed between the
major player in development activities. It is sensible that Operations, which has
the much larger job in the overall context of FAA responsibilities, receive the
allocation of resources as currently allotted. It is not sensible that the
Operations managers not be held to rigorous standards for needs identification
and accountable for disciplined approach to development of new operational
capabilities. This is not a responsibility that can be delegated to system
developers without the crucial sponsorship and intense involvement of the
internal user.
The development process does not properly define the necessary needs
analysis to consider procedural approaches. The agency also lacks the
simulation resources both to properly examine the procedural alternatives and
to develop management confidence in procedural modifications.
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Finally, ICAO represents legitimate and informed world aviation interests. FAA
management would do well to remain vigilant to international ATM system
concerns.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The FAA is now moving along briskly with its plans to enhance GPS for civil
aviation purposes. The satellite-based navigation capabilities the agency is
preparing to provide are more extensive than those identified initially by the
FANS committee and adopted by ICAO. Except for the possible exception of
some institutional issues discussed in Chapter 4, the enhancements planned
for GPS will provide all the capability identified for GNSS -- and more. The
agency has approved a Mission Need Statement, created a Program Office and
appointed a Program Manager for Satellite Navigation. The Program Office has
developed an approved Satellite Navigation Master Plan and produced a
Operational Requirements Document. The record seems to indicate that a
disciplined system development process is applied to GPS enhancement efforts
and the program is proceeding without difficulty.
Despite the current progress and indications of future success, the fact is that
the GPS capability that exists today has been implemented entirely by the DOD,
with essentially no contributions from FAA. While the plans for GPS
enhancements are strictly positive and there is no indication of problems in
implementing them, it is important to remember that GPS enhancements are still
only plans. It remains for the FAA to place the enhancements in the field (or as
may be, in space). There is no reason to believe that FAAs plans for GPS
enhancement are faulty, but there is definite reason to believe that the process
for formulating plans and managing system development leaves much to be
desired.
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We have seen that there are two major organizational groups within the agency
and each is characterized by a distinct culture. System Operations people tend
to be air traffic controllers and technicians; System Development people tend to
be engineers and analysts. The experience base and the intellectual
orientation of these two groups are significantly differerit; both are valid. Indeed
both perspectives are necessary to successful ATM modernization or to any
ATM system development. The extent of the cultural homogeneity within each
group, and the disparity between groups serve as effective obstacles to
information and goal sharing by the two groups.
The two groups are also very functionally oriented; power and authority are now
directed along functional axes. The organizational structure of the FAA is
partially a result of preferences in work style and orientation that are determined
by remarkably similar personality types among agency managers. The strong
functional bias of the organizational structure and the disposition to concentrate
on inwardly motivated, problem oriented tasks further inhibits dialog across
functional boundaries. The structure of the organization at the FAA and its
reward system, in other words, actually work to aggravate the cultural and
personality biases that, in combination, make cooperative project performance
very difficult.
Cultural boundaries that prohibit communication and cooperation should be
attacked by changing the agency organizational structure and reward system.
The current model for development is an incremental, functional approach in
which each person performs a particular task and "throws the work over the
wall" to the next person in the chain. This process concentrates on the
boundaries between participants rather than on the customer oriented goal of
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the process. Integrated process/product development (IPD) teams are a better
approach to accomplishing development activities. In the IPD approach,
personnel with all the relevant skills are dedicated to the team activity. An IPD
team would, of necessity include people from both the current System
Operations and System Development divisions as well as other divisions as
might be germane to the project. Responsibility becomes product, rather than
function, oriented. At the same time individuals are responsible to both the
team and their functional leadership for technical expertise. The main measure
of success and the main determinant of rewards is the success of the team
pursuit of new system development. IPD team structure gives development
groups the human and financial resources they need to accomplish their job,
the authority to decide from among relevant alternatives, and the commitment to
a common goal. The influence of the functional leadership should be
substantially reduced and vastly more influence given to IPD team leaders to
select and reward team members. Influence of functional managers on
personnel rewards should not be eliminated since they continue to be
responsible for performance to functional standards of excellence. Personnel
rewards are a key to success of this approach and will be the most difficult for
the FAA to institute. Several organizations have now successfully adopted the
IPD team approach with good effect and the prospects for FAA in their
development, if not all, activities are favorable.
In addition other more "tactical" issues could be addressed by FAA
management immediately. For one, there is a confused definition of concept
exploration activities that fails to properly account for analysis of potential
procedural innovations in combination with new hardware solutions to an
identified need. Emphasis on non-development and non-materiel solutions to
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satisfy emergent needs is deficient and the prescription for appropriate trade
studies occurs too late in the development process (Phase 1, Concept
Exploration rather than Phase 0, Mission Needs Analysis) to have significant
impact. This deficiency could be quickly solved by amending the Acquisition
Policy to redefine mission needs analysis to include this imperative. The more
considerable effort would be to undertake a training task to educate both
developers and operators in the need to conduct appropriate trade studies
during the needs analysis phase. Needs analysis is the key to the entire
remainder of the development process; if it is not conducted thoroughly and
systematically any project is likely to encounter difficulty along the development
path.
For another, there is no clear assignment of responsibility for engineering and
operations trade studies. The System Engineering group (ASE) is employed as
a super-program management function. Much of their effort is apparently
expended coordinating the activities of the various projects vying for resources
within FAA. While this activity is undoubtedly legitimate, there are questions as
to its effectiveness and efficiency. This is not systems engineering in the
traditional sense. More important are questions are raised about who manages
and who supports systems engineering and operations trade studies. As
practiced at the agency today, each individual program manager is left to his
own devices to compose a project team with the appropriate skills to
accomplish necessary project tasks. Instead FAA management to ensure that a
functional group is tasked with responsibility to develop and maintain a skilled
body of system engineers -- people who are expert in the disciplines of
requirements analysis and allocation. This is a unique technical discipline and
requires specific training and experience to become expert. Program managers
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should know that their needs for system engineering skills can be satisfied in
some particular place.
It is heartening to appreciate that FAA management has already recognized the
possibilities of IPD team development even if they have not fully adopted it as
the preferred management process. Two experimental developments are to be
initiated at the agency with this process in 1994. IPD is not a process that can
be implemented half way; a full commitment by management including
appropriate human resource and business support procedures are necessary
for it to be successful. For these experiments to be valid, therefore,
management must ensure that the teams receive appropriate instruction to
reorient them to the new axes of responsibility and accountability and to the
basis of a common purpose. It must also be especially vigilant to the
establishment and maintenance of appropriate incentives to team members that
do not conflict with the rest of the agency. These will be major challenges but
with proper care can be overcome.
The enhancements the FAA plans for GPS will make it a fabulously powerful
navigation source for the world's airspace users. The capabilities provided will
reach way beyond that envisioned in the FANS GNSS definition. It the FAA can
accommodate the institutional issues that are still concerns to many aviation
groups around the world it will become the standard GNSS and could do so
even in spite of those concerns. When integrated into successful
accomplishment of the rest of the agency's Capital Investment Plan,
GPSIGNSS will provide a more modern, dramatically improved ATM system.
Several organizational and management changes at the agency will ensure
those plans are enacted sooner rather than later, or not at all.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
1810.1F FAA Acquisition Policy document
A-1 09 Office of Management & Budget circular on acquisition policy
AAS Advanced Automation System
ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance
AFS FAA Flight Standards Service
AlP Airport Improvement Program
ALR Alerting Services
AND FAA NAS Development Orgnization
AOR FAA Operations Research Service
ARD FAA Research and Development Service
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
ASD FAA Administration for System Engineering and Development
ASE FAA NAS System Engineering Service
ASM Air Space Management
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATM FAA Office of Air Traffic System Management
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network
ATP FAA Air Traffic Rules & Procedures Service
ATR FAA Air Traffic Plans & Requirements Service
ATS Air Traffic Services
AVR FAA Administration for Regulation & Certification
CIP Capital Investment Plan
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CNS
COSPAS
COTS
DOD
DOT
F&E
FAA
FANS
FIS
FOP
FOR
FSAS
FTC
FWG
GLONASS
GNSS
GPS
ICAO
IGIA
ILS,
KDP
MLS
MNS
NAMFAC
NAS
NASPAL
NCS
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
SARSAT from former-Soviet Union
Commercial Off-The-Shelf
Department of Defense
Department of Transportation
Facilities and Equipment
Federal Aviation Administration
Future Air Navigation System
Flight Information Services
Future Operational Procedure
Future Operational Requirement
Flight Service Automation System
FAA Technical Center
Functional Working Group
Global Navigation Satellite System
Global Navigation Satellite System
Global Positioning System
International Civil Aviation Organization
Interagency Group for International Aviation
Instrument Landing System
Key Decision Point
Microwave Landing System
Mission Needs Statement
National Airspace Management Facility
National Airspace System
National Airspace System Precision Approach & Landing
National Simulation Capability
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NDI
NOTAM
OAP
ODAPS
OTS
PET
RAIM
RD&E
RML
RNAV
RNP
RTCA
SARP
SARSAT
SEOAT
SOIT
SSR
TCAS
TMS
VOR/DME
Non-Developmental Item
Notice to Airmen
Oceanic Automation Program
Oceanic Display and Planning System
Operational Training System
Pacific Engineering Trials
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
Research, Development and Engineering
Radio Microwave Link
Area Navigation
Required Navigation Performance
Radio Technical Commision for Aeronautics
Standard and Recommended Practices
Search and Rescue Satellite
System Engineering Operations Analysis Team
Satellite Operational Implementation Team
Secondary Surveillance Radar (i.e. with radar beacon
transponder)
Threat Alert & Collision Avoidance System
Traffic Management System
VHF Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment
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Interview Outline for ATM Modernization Thesis:
GNSS Development
Proposed interview topics for: FAA Managers
The US has the best Air Traffic Management system in the world - indisputably. The interview
contemplated here is directed at understanding the management processes used in the recent past, and planned
for the future, to continue improving the nation's ATM system. The following questions indicate the sort
of information sought. Some questions are general in nature but all are presented in the context of GNSS
development. All interviews will be confidential -not for attribution; but the final thesis, which distills
data from many interviews, will be published in unrestricted form per MIT policy.
New System Development Processes
What are your organization's responsibilities relative to the definition of requirements for the GNSS
component of the FANS concept? How have these responsibilities changed within the last ten years in
comparison with previous air traffic CNS resources?
- relative to GNSS development, test and evaluation?
- relative to GNSS acquisition?
- relative to GNSS operation?
Who do you regard as the stakeholders in determining the configuration of the future ATM environment in
the US? in the world?
In your view, are all stakeholders fairly represented? What recommendations would you make for
improving the development process for new CNS systems? For improving development of new operational
procedures?
Do you consider new CNS system developments, particularly GNSS, vital to improved productivity in the
ATM system? If not, what do you consider the major needs to be?
Budget and Domestic Political Considerations
How effective is the current budgeting process at supporting the obligations of your organization? Are your
responsibilities and obligations reasonably balanced with the human and capital resources available to you?
How long is the sensible planning horizon for your resource needs? Does the budget process allow adequate
continuity to plan to this horizon?
To what extent would you say your organization suffers from the vicissitudes of Congressional action,
compared to other parts of the FAA? Compared to a public corporation? Compared to a private company?
What is your opinion of the time required to reach decisions?
Do you have the authority to make decisions within your field? Who can countermand your decisions?
Who is accountable for decisions that have been made?
International Political Considerations
How does your organization interact with ICAO? What responsibility do you have to help lead
development of ICAO plans regarding both system development and operations?
To what extent are your operations influenced by the need to coordinate with other nations or establish
international standards?
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Interview Outline for ATM Modernization Thesis:
GNSS Development
Pipoed interview topics for. ICAO Managers
The US has the best Air Traffic Management system in the world but the need to continue system
improvement is relentless and unremitting and the need to coordinate ATM operations worldwide is
imperative. The interview contemplated here is directed at understanding the management processes used in
the recent past, and planned for the future, to continue improving the US ATM system. The following
questions indicate the sort of information sought. Some questions are general in nature but all are presented
in the context of GNSS development. All interviews will be confidential - not for attribution; but the final
thesis, which distills data from many interviews at the FAA and ICAO, will be published in unrestricted
form per MIT policy.
New Capability Definition Processes
What are your organization's responsibilities relative to the definition of requirements for the GNSS
component of the FANS concept? How have these responsibilities changed within the last ten years in
comparison with previous air traffic CNS resources?
- relative to GNSS development, test and evaluation?
- relative to GNSS acquisition?
- relative to GNSS operation?
Who do you regard as the stakeholders in determining the configuration of the future world-wide ATM
envirnnment?
In your view, are all stakeholders fairly represented? What recommendations would you make for
improving the development process for new CNS capability? For improving development of new
opeational procedures?
Do you consider new CNS system developments, particularly GNSS, vital to improved productivity in the
ATM system? If not, what do you consider the major needs to be?
How does the FAA contribute to definition of new CNS capabilities? What are the major relationships and
what data flows between FAA and ICAO relating to GNSS capability? What problems are recognized in
these relationships or data flows?
Who are the other major contributors to ICAO processes (i.e. what nations or international entities)? Are
relationships between ICAO and other entities similar to those with FAA? What differences between
relationships with FAA and the others, if any?
Budget and Political Considerations
How is ICAO funded? Is the ICAO budget process supportive of the planning required to coordinate new
capability definition and development? Are budget resources adequate to the needs of the organization?
How does ICAO enforcelcompel member states to comply with ICAO-adopted plans? How is schedule
discipline imposed on member states? How are technical standards enforced or maintained?
To what extent would you say your organization suffers from the vicissitudes of US government policy?
To what extent does it suffer from changeable policy in other member states?
What is your opinion of the time required to reach decisions?
Do you have the authority to make decisions within your field? Who can countermand your decisions?
Who is accountable for decisions that have been made?
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Appendix B
GNSS OPTIONS AND ASSOCIATED IMPLICATIONS
Notes. -
1. The five options (satellite and augmentation as required) will all provide GNSS service in accordance with RNP requirements up to and
including precision approach, and provided that the respective institutional issues are resolved and safety regulations are satisfied, could
serve as a long-term GNSS.
2. Options I through 5 can be an evolutionary progression. Therefore, failure to reach any particular option will still provide acceptable
GNSS service as long as the respective institutional issues are resolved and safety regulations are satisfied.
3. The material in this table is not exhaustive. It is expected that further analysis will modify and refine the table contents.
Satllite Augmentation Cost Items to Cost Reovery for
Option Satellite Ownership/ for Integrity Navigation Cot Ivste o Transition Institutional
Control and Accuracy Service Provider Issues FactorsAssurance Provider
1. GPS or US RAIM Ground Route charges or No charge for
GLONASS government monitor other cost recovery satellite use.
(OPS) Ground monitor station(s) method of charging Satellite
(where required availability
Government for a particular Differential per ICAO
of Russia phase of flight) commitments
(GLONASS) (Tenth AN
Differential (for Conf. & 29th
precision Assembly)
approach)
2. GPS and US RAIM Differential Route charges or Receivers No charge for
GLONASS government other cost recovery capable of satellite use.
(GPS) Ground monitor Ground method of charging GPS/ Satellite
where required monitor GLONASS availability
Government station(s), if operation per ICAO
of Russia Differential (for implemented commitmcnts
(GLONASS) precision (Tenth AN
approach) Conf & 29th
Assembly)
3.' GPS/ US RAlM Differential Route charges or Receivers No charge for
GLONASS government other cost recovery capable of (GPS/
+ Overlay (GPS) Ground monitor Ground method of cnargng GPS/ GLONASS)
where required monitor for ground systems GLONASS satellite use.
Government station(s), if operation Satellite
of Russia Differential (for implemented State reimburses availability
(GLONASS) precision overlay provider. Overlay per ICAO
approach) Overlay Costs recovered via compatibility commitments
3rd party route charges. with GPS and (Tenth AN
(eg, for GLONASS Conf. & 29th
Inmarsat Assembly)
overlay)
Appendix B fcontinued)
120- -
, 
-
Si
Stet Augmentation Cost items to Cost Recovery for
Option Satellite Ownership/ for Integrity Navigation C Items t Transition astitutionalOODiJO and Accuracy Service oIer Issues Factors
Assurance Provider Provider
4. GPS/ US RAIM Differential Route charges or GNSS Cost sharing
GLONASS government other cost recovery compatibility mechanism
+ several (GPS) Ground monitor Ground method of charging with GPS and among States
civil GNSS if required monitor for ground systems GLONASS for GNSS (US
satellites Government station(s), if and Russia
of Russia Differential (for implemented States, groups of participation
(GLONASS) precision States or to be GPS &
approach) GNSS satellite international GNSS GLONASS)
Other States launch and satellite consortium
and/or operation funded by various. User free to
parties for sources. Costs operate with
GNSS partially recovered any satellites
satellites and via route charges and
control other user charges
5. Civil GNSS 3rd party RAIM Differential Route charges or GNSS Cost sharing
satellites (or parties) other cost recovery compatibility mechanism
for GNSS Ground monitor GNSS satellite method of charging with GPS and among States
satellites and if required launch and for ground systems GLONASS for GNSS
control operation
Differential (for States, groups of Means to User free to
precision States or private transition operate with
approach) if entities or GPS and any satellites
required international GNSS GLONASS to
satellite consortium international
funded by various satellite
sources. Costs consortium
recovered via route
charges and other
user charges.
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Note: (El) Located In bams indicates event number (see Apper
Red & Underlined events are new to the process this year
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